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CHPATER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 1.1 Introduction 
 In modern economies, knowledge and innovation are the main driving forces behind 
technological progress and the resulting increase in social welfare. At the same time, it is well 
understood that economic agents who produce new ideas and goods rarely capture the whole social 
product of their activities. For example a new invention might serve as a springboard to countless new 
products but their full social value most likely is not reflected in the original innovator’s payoff, even 
if her invention is protected by intellectual property rights. Similarly, a firm that decides to locate its 
production facilities in a given geographical area will not necessarily be properly rewarded for the 
benefits which might accrue to other firms in the area (because of potential economies of scale and 
knowledge spillovers which may increase labor productivity). The presence of such external effects 
implies that there exists a potential scope for government intervention which might be welfare 
improving. Consequently, it is important to understand which policies, if any, will be most efficient in 
achieving the best possible outcome in a given situation.  
 One such area of active current research is the design of the optimal incentive structure for the 
innovation processes which are cumulative and sequential, i.e., when each new innovation is derived 
directly from the previous one. Cast in the simplest possible terms the problem here is how to ensure 
that the division of profits between the initial and subsequent inventors is such that both have an 
incentive to invest in research and development (Green and Scotchmer (1995)). This problem might 
be further complicated if one is willing to relax the somewhat limiting assumption that ideas are 
scarce and allow both inventors to participate in the each stage of the innovation process. Even 
though the resulting model of the R&D race is well known, most of the results pertaining to the 
optimal structure of intellectual property rights in such a context are limited in that they usually 
consider races with exogenous finish lines and prizes collected at the end of the R&D contest.  
 Another important limitation of the literature on the economics of the intellectual property 
rights is its exclusive focus on the instruments of patent length and breadth. In particular, it is often 
implicitly assumed that the act of doing research using a protected innovation, which is essential in 
the cumulative innovation context, is itself non-infringing. This assumption is however at odds with 
the current intellectual property systems in many developed countries where there exists no statutory 
“research exemption” provision in patent law (Eisenberg (2003)). 
 The first two essays of my dissertation attempt to fill gaps in the theoretical analysis of the 
optimal incentive structure when innovation is sequential and cumulative. In particular, the models 
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studied in these chapters feature infinite horizon races with prizes collected continuously and study 
the effects of the research exemption provision on the incentives for sequential innovation. The first 
essay (chapter 2) sets up a dynamic model of an infinite horizon R&D race between two firms and 
characterizes the Markov Perfect Equilibria of this race. Then it analyzes the welfare properties of the 
research exemption provision in this context and relates these welfare properties to the cost structure 
which characterizes the research and development process. It is shown that firms ex ante prefer a 
stronger intellectual property regime, one which does not envision the research exemption provision. 
At the same time, the model implies that social welfare might be higher or lower in presence of the 
research exemption provision depending on the cost structure. In particular, when the cost of the 
initial innovation is much higher than the cost of subsequent improvements (e.g., plant breeding), the 
stronger intellectual property regime which does not envision a research exemption will be socially 
optimal. 
 The second essay (chapter 3) revisits the question of the welfare properties of the research 
exemption in the context of a biological innovation, the value of which is affected by the problem of 
pest adaptation and resistance. This particular setup is relevant for studying incentives to invest in 
R&D which is directed towards improving the characteristics of commercially produced crop 
varieties. It is shown that in this case both firms might prefer a weaker intellectual property regime if 
the R&D cost is below a certain threshold. At the same time, it is shown that there exist conditions 
under which a stronger intellectual property regime is beneficial from the social point of view. The 
main methodological contribution of this chapter is to depart from the traditional nonrenewable 
resource approach to the pest resistance problem and to demonstrate that consideration related to the 
nature of the innovation process and intellectual property rights should play a role in guiding public 
policy in this area. 
 The third essay (chapter 4) attempts to cover new ground by undertaking an empirical study of 
the phenomenon of the urban wage premium. It has been argued that wage advantage of the workers 
residing in densely populated urban areas over the identical workers in rural areas reflects primarily 
the productivity advantage of the urban labor force (Glaeser and Mare (2001)). In particular, it is 
often argued that both economies of scale and knowledge spillovers are the driving forces in this 
process. If true, such claims provide empirical support to policies which seek to create such effect, by 
subsidizing various forms of agglomerations such as technology parks and innovation clusters.  
 In my essay however I draw attention to important caveats in the empirical analysis commonly 
employed in the urban wage premium studies. I argue that potential endogeneity of the geographical 
location of a given individual might lead to inconsistent estimates of the urban wage premium. In 
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particular, if cities attract workers of higher unobserved ability, then one would expect to observe a 
wage premium even in the absence of the local spillover effects. To test this hypothesis I use data 
from the National Survey of Families and Households to evaluate two econometric models which 
explicitly account for non-random selection based on unobservable characteristics. I find that the 
wage premium can be fully explained by unobserved heterogeneity in the workers characteristics. 
 
 1.2 Thesis Organization 
 The three essays described in the introduction are all self-contained with their own 
Introduction, Conclusion and Reference sections. They are followed by the General Conclusion 
section.  
 
 1.3 References 
Eisenberg, R.S., “Patent swords and shields,” Science, 2003, 299(February 14), 1018-1019. 
 
E.L. Glaeser and D.C. Mare. Cities and skills. Journal of Labor Economics, 19:316–342, 2001. 
 
Green, J., and Scotchmer, S., “On the division of profit in sequential innovation,” RAND Journal of 
Economics, 1995, 26(1), 20-33. 
 
 4
CHAPTER 2. PATENTS, RESEARCH EXEMPTION, AND THE INCENTIVE FOR 
SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 
 
 2.1  Introduction 
 The economic analysis of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has long emphasized their ability 
to provide a solution to the appropriability and free-rider problems that beset the competitive 
provision of innovations (see Scotchmer, 2004, for an overview).  But whereas there is agreement that 
legally provided rights and institutions are necessary to offer suitable incentives for inventive and 
creative activities, it is less clear what the extent of such rights should be.  The predicament here is 
very much related to the second-best nature of the proposed solution to the market failures that arise 
in this context (Arrow, 1962).  Because they work by creating a degree of monopoly power, IPRs 
introduce a novel source of distortions.  Whereas the prospect of monopoly profits can be a powerful 
ex ante incentive for the would-be innovator, and can bring about innovations that would not 
otherwise take place, the monopoly position granted by the exclusivity of IPRs is inefficient from an 
ex post point of view (the innovation is underutilized).  This is the essential economic trade-off of 
most IPR systems: there are dynamic gains due to more powerful innovation incentives, but there are 
static losses because of a restricted use of innovations (Nordhaus, 1969). 
 The trade-off of IPR systems is more acute when one considers that new products and 
processes are themselves the natural springboard for more innovations and discoveries (Scotchmer, 
1991).  When innovation is cumulative, the first inventor is not necessarily compensated for her 
contribution to the social value created by subsequent inventions.  This problem is particularly 
evident when the first invention constitutes basic research (perhaps leading to so-called research 
tools) that is not directly of interest to final users.  To address this intertemporal externality requires 
the transfer of profits from successful applications of a given patented innovation to the original 
inventor(s).  What the features of an IPR system should be to achieve that has been addressed in a 
number of studies.  Green and Scotchmer (1995) consider how patent breadth and patent length 
should be set in order to allow the first inventor to cover his cost, subject to the constraint that the 
second-generation innovation is profitable, and highlight the critical role of licensing.  This and 
related studies, including Scotchmer (1996), and Matutes, Regibeau, and Rockett (1996), can be 
viewed as supporting strong patent protection for the initial innovations.  Somewhat different 
conclusions can emerge, however, when the two innovation stages are modeled as R&D races 
(Denicolò, 2000).    
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 A critical issue, in this setting, relates to how one models the features of an IPR system, and the 
foregoing studies emphasize the usefulness of the concepts of “patentability” and “infringement.”  
For instance, in the two-period model of Green and Scotchmer (1995), both innovations are presumed 
patentable, and the question is whether or not the second innovation should be considered as 
infringing on the original discovery. The notion of patentability refers broadly to the “novelty” and 
“nonobviousness” requirements of the patents statute (so that, as in O’Donoghue (1998) and Hunt 
(2004), one can define the minimum innovation size required to get a patent).  On the other hand, the 
context for infringement is defined by the “breadth” of patent rights.  This property can be made 
especially clear in quality ladder models of sequential innovation through the notion of “leading 
breadth”—the minimum size of quality improvement that makes a follow-on innovation non-
infringing (O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò and Zanchettin, 2002).    
 By contrast, in this paper we study how the IPR system affects incentives in a sequential 
innovation setting by focusing on the so-called “research exemption” or “experimental use” doctrine.  
When a research exemption exists, proprietary knowledge and technology can be used freely in 
others’ research programs aimed at developing a new product or process (which, if achieved, would 
in principle still be subject to patentability and infringement standards).  On the other hand, if a 
research exemption is not envisioned, the mere act of trying to improve on an existing product may be 
infringing (regardless of success and/or commercialization of the second-generation product).  In the 
U.S. patent system there is no general statutory “research exemption” and, as clarified by the 2002 
Madey v. Duke University decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), the 
experimental use defense against infringement based on case law precedents can only be construed as 
extremely narrow (Eisenberg, 2003).  On the other hand, a special research exemption is 
contemplated for pharmaceutical drugs as part of the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, 
whereby firms intending to market generic pharmaceuticals are exempted from patent infringement 
for the purpose of developing information necessary to gain federal regulatory approval.1  
Furthermore, a few specialized intellectual property statutes—including the 1970 Plant Variety 
Protection Act and the 1984 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act—contemplate a well-defined 
research exemption.  Indeed, the innovation environment and the intellectual property context for 
plants offer perhaps the sharpest characterization of the possible implications of a research exemption 
in a sequential setting, and we will consider them in more detail in what follows.   
                                         
1 The recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, in Merck v. Integra, appears not only to uphold but 
also to extend the scope of the Hatch-Waxman experimental use defense (Feit 2005). 
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 The intense debate that followed the CAFC ruling in Madey has renewed interest in the 
desirability of a research exemption in patent law (Thomas, 2004).  Quite clearly, a broad research 
exemption may have serious consequences for the profitability of innovations from basic research, 
thereby adversely affecting the incentives for research and development (R&D) in some industries 
that rely extensively on research tools (e.g., biotechnology).  On the other hand, there is the concern 
that limiting the experimental use of proprietary knowledge in research may have a negative effect on 
the resulting flow of innovations.  Explicit economic modeling of the research exemption, however, 
appears to be lacking.  In this paper we propose to contribute to the economic analysis of the research 
exemption in IPR systems by focusing on the case of strictly sequential and cumulative innovations.  
 The quality ladder model developed in this paper draws upon the modeling approach of Bessen 
and Maskin (2002), while conceptually it belongs to the line of research on the optimal patent breadth 
discussed earlier.  Bessen and Maskin find that it might be optimal, both from the social and 
individual firm’s point of view, to have weak patent protection when innovation is cumulative.  This 
result is driven by a critical complementarity assumption, in particular that the improvement 
possibilities on the quality ladder are exhausted if all firms fail to innovate in any given period 
(implying that having rivals engaged in R&D might, in principle, be beneficial).  We depart from the 
Bessen and Maskin setup by formulating a fully dynamic model of an infinite-horizon stochastic 
innovation race suitable for an explicit characterization of equilibrium. To do so, we find it desirable 
to formulate the “complementarities” between firms somewhat differently.  Specifically, in our 
formulation the quest for the next innovation step does not end when both firms are unsuccessful 
(both can try again).  
 Related literature includes formal models of dynamic R&D competition between firms engaged 
in “patent races.”2 As with most contributions in this setting we postulate a memoryless stochastic 
arrival of innovation; to keep a closer connection with the setup of Bessen and Maskin (2002), we 
model that process by means of a geometric distribution, rather than with exponential distribution 
typically used when modeling R&D races (e.g., Reinganum 1989). More importantly, in our model 
we delineate precisely the differences between the two IPR modes of interest (i.e., patents with and 
without the research exemption). In most R&D dynamic competition models, on the other hand, the 
nature of the underlying intellectual property regime is not addressed explicitly and IPR effects are 
often captured by a generic winner-takes-all condition. In addition, in our model both the incumbent 
and challenger can perform R&D, production takes place alongside R&D, and the stage payoffs are 
                                         
2 We cannot begin to do justice to this copious literature—see Tirole (1988, chapter 10) for an 
introduction. 
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state-dependent (an attractive feature, in a quality ladder setting, under typical market structures). 
Conversely, to keep the analysis tractable, here we consider a fixed number of firms (two) and thus 
we neglect the issue of entry in the R&D contest that has been prominent in many previous studies.  
We also assume away the inefficiency of the static patent-monopoly case, as in other studies in this 
area, but still allow for dynamic welfare spillovers to consumers via a Bertrand competition 
assumption.        
In what follows we first discuss in some detail the intellectual property environment for 
plants, a context that provides perhaps the sharpest example of the possible implications of a research 
exemption.  We then develop a new game-theoretic model of sequential innovation that captures the 
stylized features of the problem at hand.  The model is solved by relying on the notion of Markov 
perfect equilibrium under the two distinct intellectual property regimes of interest.  The results permit 
a first investigation of the dynamic incentive issues entailed by the existence of a research exemption 
provision in intellectual property law.  First, we find that the firms themselves always prefer (ex ante) 
the full patent protection regime (unlike what happens in Bessen and Maskin, 2002).  The social 
ranking of the two intellectual property regimes, on the other hand, depends on the relative 
magnitudes of the costs of initial innovation and improvements. It must be said that we impose a 
rather stark assumption about the nature of IP regime in the absence of research exemption provision 
(the winner of the first race becomes a monopolist forever and faces no competition), which in 
principle should bias our results in favor of the research exemption.3 Interestingly, even with this 
stylized model, we still find that research exemption need not result in higher level of social welfare.   
In particular, the research exemption is most likely to provide inadequate incentives when there is a 
large cost to establishing a research program (as is arguably the case for the plant breeding industry 
where developing a new variety typically takes several years). On the other hand, when both initial 
and improvement costs are small relative to the expected profits (perhaps the case of the software 
industry noted by Bessen and Maskin, 2002), the weaker incentive to innovate is immaterial (firms 
engage in R&D anyway) and the research exemption regime dominates.  
 
 
 
                                         
3 Even though this assumption is restrictive, it is fairly standard in the economics of innovation literature to 
consider only very stylized environments, such as monopoly versus duopoly, or monopoly versus free entry, in 
order to obtain a tractable model which would allow for sharper conclusions (see Mitchell and Skrzypacz 
(2005) for a recent example). 
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 2.2  A Model of Sequential and Cumulative Innovation 
 We develop an infinite-horizon production and R&D contest between two firms under two 
possible IPR regimes—that is, with and without the research exemption. The model that we construct 
is sequential and cumulative and reflects closely the stylized features of plant breeding.  This industry 
is also of interest because, as mentioned, it has access to a sui generis IPR system that contemplates a 
well-defined research exemption.   
 
2.2.1  A Motivating Example: PVP, Patents, and the “Research Exemption” 
 The Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Act of 1970 introduced a form of IPR protection for 
sexually reproducible plants that complemented that for asexually reproduced plants of the 1930 Plant 
Patent Act and represented the culmination of a quest to provide IPRs for innovations thought to lie 
outside the statutory subject matter of utility patents (Bugos and Kevles, 1992).   PVP certificates, 
issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, afford exclusive rights to the varieties’ owners that are 
broadly similar to those provided by patents, including the standard 20-year term, with two major 
qualifications: there is a “farmer’s privilege,” that is, seed of protected varieties can be saved by 
farmers for their own replanting; and, more interestingly for our purposes, there is a “research 
exemption,” meaning that protected varieties may be used by other breeders for research purposes 
(Roberts, 2002).  In addition to PVP certificates, to assert their intellectual property, plant innovators 
can rely on trade secrets, the use of hybrids, and specific contractual arrangements (such as bag-label 
contracts).  More importantly, in the United States plant breeders can now also rely on utility patents.  
The landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty opened the door for 
patent rights for virtually any biologically based invention and, in its 2001 J.E.M. v. Pioneer decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that plant seeds and plants themselves (both traditionally bred or 
produced by genetic engineering) are patentable under U.S. law (Janis and Kesan, 2002).   
 As noted earlier, the U.S. patent law does not have a statutory research exemption (apart from 
the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act discussed earlier).  Hence, a plant breeder who elects to rely 
on patents can prevent others from using the protected germplasm in rivals’ breeding programs.  That 
is not possible when the protection is afforded by PVP certificates.  The question then arises as to 
which IPR system is best for plant innovation, and whether the recently granted access to utility 
patents significantly changed the innovation incentives for U.S. plant breeders.  Alternatively, one can 
consider the differences in the degrees of protection conferred by patents and PVPs in an international 
context.  Rights similar to those granted by PVP certificates, known generically as “plant breeder’s 
rights” (PBRs), are available for plant innovations in most other countries, but patents are not (Le 
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Buanec, 2004).  Indeed, under the TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) 
agreement of the World Trade Organization, it is not mandatory for a signatory country to offer patent 
protection for plant and animal innovations, as long as a sui generis system (such as that of PBRs) is 
available (Moschini, 2004).  Thus, in many countries (including most developing countries), PBRs 
are the only available intellectual property protection for plant varieties.4
 Given the structural differences between patents and PBRs, the notion of a research exemption 
is clearly central to this intellectual property context. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the 
prototypical sequential and cumulative nature of R&D in plant breeding can be closely represented by 
a quality ladder model.  Plant breeding is a lengthy and risky endeavor that has been defined as 
consisting of developing new genetic diversity (e.g., new varieties) by the reassembling of existing 
diversity. Thus, the process is both sequential and cumulative, because new varieties would seek to 
maintain the desirable features of the ones they are based on while adding new attributes.  As such, a 
critical input in this process is the starting germplasm (whole genome), and that in turn is critically 
affected by whether or not one has access to existing successful varieties, which in turns is directly 
affected by a research exemption.  In a dynamic context, of course, the quality of the existing 
germplasm is itself the result of (previous) breeding decisions, and so it is directly affected by the 
features of the IPR regime in place.  Industry views on the matter highlight the possibility that freer 
access to others’ germplasm will erode the incentive for critical pre-breeding activities aimed at 
widening the germplasm diversity base (Donnenwirth, Grace, and Smith, 2004).   
 
2.2.2  Model Outline 
 We consider two firms that are competing to develop a new product variety along a particular 
development trajectory.  At time zero both firms have access to the same germplasm and, upon 
investing an amount , achieve success with probability 0c p  (each firm’s outcome is independent of 
the other’s).  We refer to the pursuit of the first innovation as the “Initial Game.”  Note that in this 
model the R&D process is costly and risky, and that the two firms are identical ex ante (i.e., the game 
is symmetric).  If at least one firm is successful, the initial game terminates and a patent is awarded.  
When only one firm is successful, that firm gets the patent.  When both firms are successful, the 
                                         
4 Even in European countries, where plant innovations are included in the patentable subject matter, 
somewhat anachronistically, plant varieties per se are explicitly not patentable by the statute of the 
European Patent Office (Fleck and Baldock, 2003). 
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patent is randomly awarded (with equal probability) to one of them.  If neither firm is successful, they 
have the option of trying again, which would require a new investment of .   0c
 Given at least one success, the contest moves to the production and improvement stage, which 
we call the “Improvement Game.”  At the start of this game, firms are asymmetric: one of them, 
referred to as the “Leader,” has been successful (and holds the patent) whereas the other firm, referred 
to as the “Follower,” has not (does not).  There are two relevant activities that characterize the 
improvement game: rent extraction through production, and further R&D efforts.  Rent extraction is 
the prerogative of the Leader: specifically, the leading firm captures a return of  in the first period 
of the improvement game.  What happens to the distribution of rent after the first period may depend 
on possible R&D undertaken in the improvement game, and that, in turn, depends on the property 
rights conveyed by the patent awarded at the end of the initial game.  For the latter, we distinguish 
between two prototypical IPR regimes that differ according to the treatment reserved for the research 
exemption.  The R&D structure of the improvement game is similar to that of the initial game: upon 
an initial investment, a firm achieves the next improvement with probability 
∆
p .  But to recognize that 
the initial innovation is “more important” in some well-defined sense, we assume that the per-period 
cost of R&D in the improvement game is 0c c≤ .  
 Whether or not both firms can participate in the improvement game depends on the nature of 
IPRs, specifically on whether or not a “research exemption” is contemplated.  The first regime that 
we consider, which we refer to as “Full Patent” (FP), presumes that the patent awards an exclusive 
right to the patent holder, such that further innovations can be pursued only by the patent holder (or 
upon a license by the patent holder).  Thus, the FP regime characterizes the environment of U.S. 
utility patents which, as discussed earlier, envisions an extremely limited role for a research 
exemption.  The second regime, which we refer to as the “Research Exemption” (RE), allows any 
firm (i.e., including the Follower) to pursue the next innovation, although the patent gives the right of 
rent extraction (i.e., collecting  in the current period) to the holder of the patent.  Hence, the RE 
regime reflects the attributes of a PBR system, such as the one implemented in the United States 
under the PVP Act.  We should note that both patents and PBRs confer rights that are limited in time 
(20 years).  But because we are characterizing the differences between the two regimes, without much 
loss of generality we ignore this feature and model both rights as having, in principle, infinite 
duration.  
∆
 Under the FP regime, therefore, only the patent holder can pursue further innovations.  Ignoring 
the possibility of licensing (we will return to this issue later), we model the improvement game under 
the FP regime as a monopoly undertaking by the firm that won the initial game.  Under the RE 
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regime, on the other hand, both firms are allowed to participate in the follow-up R&D.  Because 
under the RE both firms can use the same starting point, upon a success in the first improvement 
game we either have the Leader owning two consecutive innovations or the Follower being the 
successful firm and thereby becoming the Leader. We emphasize again that the foregoing structure 
reflects the strict sequential and cumulative nature of the innovation process that we wish to model: 
the current quality level is, in effect, an essential input into the production of the next quality level. 
 Each additional innovation is worth an additional ∆ , per period, to society.5  What a success is 
worth to the innovator, however, depends on the IPR regime and on the possible constraining effects 
of competition among innovators.  We make the simplifying assumption that only the best product is 
sold in this market, but what the owner can charge is the marginal value over what the competitor can 
offer (i.e., we assume Bertrand competition).  For example, if two firms have achieved n  and m  
innovation steps, respectively, with , the firm with  steps will be the one selling any product 
and will make an ex post per-period profit of 
m n> m
( )m n− ∆ .    
 To summarize, we consider an infinite-horizon R&D contest between two firms under two 
possible IPR regimes.  Under the FP regime both firms can participate in the initial game, but only the 
successful firm may be engaged in the improvement games.  Under the RE regime both firms can 
participate in both the initial game and the improvement games. 
 
2.2.3  The Stochastic Game 
 To formalize the model outlined in the foregoing as an infinite-horizon R&D stochastic game, 
the set of players (the two firms) is { }1,2G ≡ .  At each stage {0,1,2,....}t =  of the initial game, 
labeled , the two firms simultaneously choose an action  from the history-invariant action set 0Γ ita
{ },A I N≡ , where  = invest and = no investment.  Action  entails a cost to the firm of  
and brings success with probability 
I N I 0 0c >
(0,1)p∈  if the other firm does not invest, whereas it brings 
success with probability  if the other firm also invests.  Specifically, when both firms invest, 
and firms’ outcomes are independent, the probability of at least one success is 
(0, )q∈ p
21 (1 )p− − , and thus 
(2 ) 2q p p≡ − .  At the beginning of the initial game, firms are identical and the game is symmetric. 
After a single “success” the firms will be asymmetric for the rest of the game.  Under the FP regime 
                                         
5 Because in our model we capture the asymmetry between initial innovation and follow-up 
improvements by postulating different R&D costs (  and c ), we assume that the value of each 
successive quality improvement is the same. 
0c
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the loser of the initial game drops out and the winner becomes a monopolist in both the exploitation 
of the innovation and in further R&D activities.  Under the RE regime, on the other hand, both firms 
can participate in the improvement game. If a firm chooses to invest in any period of the 
improvement game, the required cost is [ ]00,c c∈ , and the success probabilities are just as in the 
initial game (i.e., a single firm innovates with probability p , and when both firms invest each wins 
the contest with probability ).   q
 The improvement game under the FP regimes is technically not a game because there are no 
strategic interactions (the winner of the initial game is a monopolist).  Under the RE regime, on the 
other hand, we actually have a family of improvement games, which we label as , with each  
distinguished by the number  of successive innovation steps held by the Leader.  Thus, 
after the first innovation we have 
kΓ
1,2,3,...k =
1k = .  If the Leader is the firm that innovates again then we have 
 and the status of each firm does not change.  Whenever the Follower wins the stage game, 
however, then firms swap their roles (e.g., the Follower becomes the Leader) and the number of steps 
ahead that determines the payoff drops back to 
2k =
1k = .  Hence, 1,2,3,...k =  represents one of the 
“state” variables of the game.   Figure 1 provides an illustration.  Note that, in this setup, the RE 
regime ensures that “leapfrogging” is possible, although the Leader’s advantage can also accumulate 
and persist, whereas with the FP regime there is “persistence” of the monopoly position provided by 
the initial innovation.6
 Stage payoffs are determined under a Bertrand competition assumption.  Specifically, under 
either regime, in each period the last firm to be successful (the Leader) collects an amount k∆ , where 
 measures the per-period value of a stage innovation, and c∆ > {1,2,3,...}k ∈  denotes the total 
number of innovation steps that the leading firm has over the competitor.  The value of the entire 
game to the firms, from the perspective of the initial period and under the two IPR regimes of interest, 
is derived in what follows.  Throughout, (0,1)δ ∈  denotes the discount factor. 
 
 
                                         
6 These are two recurrent concepts in patent race models (Tirole, 1988, chapter 10).  The persistence 
of monopoly was studied by, among others, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Reinganum (1983).  The 
notion of leapfrogging was introduced by Fudenberg et al. (1983).  Whereas our model does not focus 
on these two issues, it does emphasize that they may be directly affected by the specific features of 
the relevant IPR system. 
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 2.3 Equilibria in the Improvement Games 
 We characterize the equilibrium solution of the improvement games first and, by standard 
backward induction principles, analyze the initial games next, under both IPR regimes that we have 
described.  As explained in more detail in what follows, we will focus on “Markov strategies,” 
whereby the history of the game is allowed to affect strategies only through state variables that 
summarize the payoff-relevant attributes of the strategic environment (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, 
chapter 13).  Thus, our equilibrium concept will be that of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), that 
is, a profile of Markov strategies that yields a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (Maskin and Tirole, 
2001).   
 
2.3.1  Improvement Game under the Full Patent Regime 
 As noted, here we do not really have a game, just an optimization problem where, at each stage, 
the firm that is allowed to invest has to choose an action from { . Such a firm is effectively a 
monopolist in the improvement game.  If it chooses action  at any one stage success will occur with 
probability 
, }I N
I
p  and hence the expected payoff to choosing action  in that stage is I (1 )c pδ δ− + ∆ −  
(because success yields a stage payoff ∆  forever starting with the next period). Hence action  is 
optimal in any one stage i.f.f. 
I
0(1 )c p xδ δ∆ ≤ − ≡ .  Naturally, if it is optimal for such a monopolist 
to choose action  at any one stage, then it is optimal to do so in every stage and hence the 
investment rule does not depend on . If the condition 
I
k 0c x∆ ≤  for the optimality of action  holds, 
the expected payoff of the patent holder at the start of the improvement game when the state is , 
labeled , therefore is: 
I
k
( )MV k
( )2( ) 1 1M
k c pV k δδ δ
∆ − ∆= +− −   .       (1) 
If, on the other hand, 0c ∆ > x , then the patent holder’s optimal action would be  and the payoff N
( )( ) 1MV k k δ= ∆ − . 
 
2.3.2  Improvement Game(s) under the Research Exemption Regime 
 In the improvement game under the RE regime firms are asymmetric.  The firm with the last 
success is the Leader who can earn returns from the market (in proportion to the number of extra 
innovation steps that it has relative to the competitor, which we have denoted as ).  The other firm, 
labeled as the Follower, does not earn current return but has the same opportunities to engage in R&D 
k
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as the other firm.  As discussed earlier, 1,2,3,...k =  represents one of the “state” variables of the 
game.  The other state variable of the game is the identity of the Leader, { }1,2G∈ ≡A .  Together, 
 summarize all the payoff-relevant information of the history of the game leading up to any 
particular subgame. 
( , )k A
 We consider only Markov strategies, so that the strategy of a firm only depends on the state of 
the game.  The state space of the game is S G≡ ×` , where G  is the set of players defined earlier, 
and { }1,2,...≡`  is the set of natural numbers.  A Markov strategy here is defined as a function 
, .  Specifically, the strategy [ ]: 0,1i Sσ → i G∈ ( , )i kσ A  tells us the probability that player i  will 
attach to action  when the state is ( .  Thus, at any stage of the game with the same state, the 
Markov strategy 
I , )kA
iσ  specifies the same probability distribution over available actions.  Although the 
use of Markov strategies is somewhat restrictive, it is standard in the dynamic oligopoly models in 
general and in the models of innovation races in particular (e.g., Bar, 2005; Hörner, 2004).  
 Alternatively, we can characterize the strategy of the two “types” of firms.  Conditional on 
being a Leader, the only payoff-relevant state is the number of innovation steps  that the Leader has 
over the Follower.  Similarly, conditional on being the Follower, the only relevant state is again the 
number of innovations steps  that the Leader is enjoying.  [Note: the stage and continuation payoffs 
to the Follower actually do not depend on .  But because  affects the Leader’s payoffs, a Markov 
strategy for the Follower must also condition on .]  Thus, with some abuse of notation, we can write 
the strategy of the Leader as 
k
k
k k
k
( )L kσ and the strategy of the Follower as ( )F kσ .7
 At any stage of the game, the expected payoff of a firm for the subgame starting at that point, 
for given strategies of the two firms, depends on the firm being a Leader or a Follower.  For given 
strategies of the two firms, the payoff to the Follower does not depend on how many steps behind the 
Follower is lagging the Leader.  The payoff to the Leader, on the other hand, does depend on the 
number of leads it has.  Thus, for a given strategy profile ( , )L Fσ σ σ≡ , for the game  we can 
write the payoff to the Follower as 
kΓ
( , )F L FV σ σ  and the payoff to the Leader as ( , , )L L FV kσ σ .   
Recalling that δ  denotes the discount factor, these value functions must satisfy the following 
recursive equations:   
                                         
7 Hörner (2004) similarly uses Markov strategies where the state space is the set of integers.  But note 
that the stage payoff in Hörner only depends on whether the firm is a Leader or a Follower, whereas 
in our model stage payoffs ( ) are state-dependent. k∆
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[ ]
[ ]
( )
( , ) ( , 1) ( ) (1 2 ) ( , )
               + (1 ) ( , 1) (1 ) ( , )
               +(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
L L F L F L
L F L L
L F F L F L
V k k c q V k q V q V k
c p V k p V k
p V p V k V
σ σ σ δ σ δ σ δ σ
σ σ δ σ δ σ
σ σ δ σ δ σ σ δ σ
= ∆ + − + + + + −
− − + + + −
− + − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦k
 (2) 
[ ]
[ ]
( ) ( ,1) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( ,1) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
F F L L F
F L L F F F
V c q V q V
c p V p V V
σ σ σ δ σ δ σ
σ σ δ σ δ σ σ δ
= − + + −
+ − − + + − + − σ  (3) 
 As discussed earlier, we have a family of improvement games kΓ , each of which differs only 
in the number of improvement steps that the Leader has over the Follower—the number  that 
identifies the state variable of the game.  Under our Bertrand pricing assumption, only the highest 
quality of the product is sold in the market and the per-period (gross) return to the firm selling it is 
. To find the MPE we start with the simplest case in which 
k
k∆ ( ) ( ) 1L Fk kσ σ= =  for all 1,2,...k = .  
 
Lemma 1. Suppose that, in the improvement game with a research exemption, ( ) 1L kσ =  and 
[ ]( ) 0,1F kσ φ= ∈ , for all  . Then,   1,2,...k =
(i)  
[ ]
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 (1 (1 ) )1 (1 2 (1 ) )
( )
(1 ) 1 (1 2 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 2 )F F
c qq q p
V V
q q q
δδ δσ δ δ δ δ δ
− − +∆ − − − −= −− − − − − − − −
v vv v v
v v v
≡  (4) 
(ii) 
( )
( )2
(1 )
( , )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
F
L
q pc q V kV k
q q q
δδσ δ δ δ
∆ + −− + ∆= + +− − − − − −
v vv
v v v
 .   (5)  
 
The proof of this result is confined to the Appendix. Thus, when the Leader invests in every period 
with probability one while the Follower invests with the same probability  in every period, 
Lemma 1 provides close-form expression for the value of being the Leader or the Follower 
(conditional on the constant, but arbitrary, mixing probability 
[0,1φ ∈ ]
φ ). These expressions will prove useful 
in establishing the MPE for the improvement game claimed in Proposition 1. Note that the value to 
being the Follower does not depend on the number of leads possessed by the Leader.  This is because, 
if successful in the stage R&D race, the new Leader obtains a one-step lead over the other firm (under 
our Bertrand pricing assumption). The value to being a Leader, on the other hand, increases with , 
the number of improvement steps of the Leader not matched by the Follower, as well as being 
increasing in the stage payoff  and decreasing in R&D cost c .  
k
∆
 Next we establish a complete characterization of the conditions under which the Follower 
and/or the Leader actually invest in the equilibrium of the improvement games.  For that purpose, we 
define the threshold levels:  
 
 16
 0 1
px δ δ≡ −          (6) 
 
( )
( )1
1 (1 )
(1 ) 1 (1 )
q p
x
q
δ δ
δ δ
− −≡ − − −         (7) 
 ( )2 1 (1 )
qx
q
δ
δ≡ − −  .        (8) 
Note that, under the assumed structure of the model, 0 1 2x x x> > .  Given that, the firms’ equilibrium 
investment decisions in the improvement game are as follows. 
 
Proposition 1.   Then MPE of the improvement game satisfies: 
(i) If 2c ∆ ≤ x  then ( ) 1L kσ =  and ( ) 1F kσ =  for all 1,2,...k = .  
(ii) If 2 1x c≤ ∆ ≤ x  then  ( ) 1L kσ =  and [ ]( ) 0,1F kσ φ= ∈  for all 1,2,...k = . 
(iii) If 1 0x c≤ ∆ ≤ x , then ( ) 1L kσ =  and ( ) 0F kσ =  for all 1,2,...k = . 
(iv)  if 0x c≤ ∆ , then ( ) ( ) 0L Fk kσ σ= =  for all 1,2,...k = . 
 
The proof, confined to the Appendix, relies on establishing that neither Leader nor Follower have a 
one-stage deviation from the proposed strategy that would increase his payoff. Because this game is 
continuous at infinity—that is, the difference between payoffs from any two strategy profiles will be 
arbitrary close to zero provided that these strategy profiles coincide for sufficiently large number of 
periods starting from the beginning of the game—Theorem 4.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) 
implies that the proposed strategy profile is the MPE. 
 Thus, when the R&D cost  is low enough, relative to the stage reward , both firms invest 
with probability one in every stage.  In this case the value functions of the Leader and of the Follower 
reduce to: 
c ∆
( ) ( )
( 1)( , )
1 1 (1L
c kV k
q
σ δ δ
∆ − − ∆= +− − − )  .       (9) 
( )
( )[ ]
1 (1 )
1 1 (1 )F
q q
V
q
δ δ
δ δ
∆ − − −= − − −
c
        (10) 
Note that the value of being a Leader when  is decreasing in the R&D success probability.  
Intuitively, when both firms engage in R&D in every period, the Leader with more than one step lead 
has more to lose than to gain from the R&D context.  As for the Follower,  as 
1k >
0FV → 2c x∆ → .  
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But were the Follower to choose action  for all N 2c x∆ ≥ , the value to being a Leader would jump 
from ( , )LV kσ  as in equation (9) to MV  as given in equation (1).  But then, if the firm that is a 
Follower in any one stage believes that future Followers always choose action , then by deviating 
to  in that stage the firm would obtain a positive probability of becoming an uncontested Leader, 
with an associated strictly positive payoff.  Thus, 
N
I
( ) 0F kσ =  for all  cannot be part of an 
equilibrium when 
k
2x c< ∆  but c ∆  is close to 2x .  The MPE in the domain 2 1x c x≤ ∆ ≤ , 
therefore, entails the Follower’s use of a mixed strategy, whereby the Follower invests with 
probability  in all stages.  Specifically, as derived in the Appendix, the mixing probability [0,1φ ∈ ] φ  
in this domain is the positive root that solves the quadratic equation 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 2 ) (1 ) 0c q q q q pδ δ δ δ δ− − − + − − + ∆ − − + − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦v v v v      (11) 
At 1c ∆ = x  equation (11) yields 0=v .  At this point the Follower drops out of the improvement 
game and only the Leader finds it profitable to invest.  In fact, it can be verified that, when evaluated 
at 1c ∆ = x  and , the Leader’s payoff is equal to the monopolist’s payoff.  For 0=v 1 0x c x≤ ∆ ≤  
only the Leader invests (with probability one) in the improvement stage, whereas for 0x c< ∆  no 
firm invests. Thus, for 1x c≤ ∆  the FP regime and the RE regimes are equivalent as far as the 
improvement game is concerned. 
 The conclusions of Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 2, which represents the type of 
equilibrium strategies that apply for various ranges of the parameter ratio c ∆ .  When R&D is too 
costly, relative to the expected payoff, no innovation takes place; the range of  parameters that 
supports this outcome is the same under either regimes (i.e., 0c x∆ > ).  With a more favorable 
cost/benefit ratio the incumbent in the FP regime will find it worthwhile to engage in improvements.  
In this parameter space the RE regime supports only one firm if 1 0x c x< ∆ ≤ , and two firms if 
10 c x≤ ∆ ≤ .   
The payoff to the two firms in this type of equilibrium are of some importance.  By using the 
expression in equation (4) of Lemma 1, and evaluating it at the φ  which solves the equilibrium 
condition in (11), we find that   in the domain 0FV = 2 1x c x≤ ∆ ≤ .   
The payoff to the Leader, on the other hand, at the φ  which solves (11) is: 
( 1)( , )
1 (1 )L
c kV k
q q
σ δ δ
− ∆= + − −v        (12) 
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Thus, in the domain 2 1x c≤ ∆ ≤ x  the payoff to the Leader is increasing in the R&D cost c .  That is, 
the gain from the weakening R&D competition (the Follower invests with a decreasing probability as 
 increases) more than outweigh the direct negative impact of R&D cost.  That the Leader’s payoff 
must be increasing on some part of the domain when 
c
2x c≤ ∆  is clear when one notes that the 
monopolist’s payoff at 0c ∆ = x  and the Leader’s payoff at 2c x∆ =  satisfy: 
( )0 2( ) ( , )(1 ) 1 (1 )M c x c x
k kV k V k
q
σδ δ∆= ∆=
∆ ∆= > =− − − L    (13) 
The equilibrium payoff to the Leader and the Follower are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 The threshold levels 0x , 1x  and 2x  that we have identified satisfy intuitive comparative 
statics properties, such as 0 1 2 0x p x p x p∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ >  and 0 1 2 0x x xδ δ δ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ > .  More 
interestingly, the foregoing analysis shows that, in a well defined sense, under the RE regime the 
Leader has a stronger incentive to invest in improvements than does the Follower.  This property of 
the MPE reflects the carrot and stick nature of the incentives at work here, what Beath, Katsoulacos 
and Ulph (1989) call the “profit incentive” and the “competitive threat.”   The carrot is the same for 
both contenders—a successful innovation brings an additional per-period reward of . But the stick 
differs. For the Follower, failure to innovate when the opponent is successful does not change her 
situation (recall that the value function of the Follower is invariant to the state of the game).  But for 
the Leader, failure to innovate when the opponent is successful implies the loss of the current gross 
returns .    
∆
k∆
 
 2.4 Equilibrium in the Initial Game 
 The initial investment game has a structure similar to that of the improvement game. The major 
differences are the following: (i) the cost of investment in R&D is equal to ; (ii) both firms are 
in exactly the same position and the per-period profit flow in the investment game is equal to zero; 
and (iii) the game ends as soon as one of the firms obtains the first successful innovation.  We will 
consider the FP regime first. 
0c ≥ c
 
2.4.1. Full Patent Regime 
 We find that the equilibrium depends critically on the postulated asymmetry between initial 
innovation and follow-on improvements.  To facilitate exposition, it is useful to refer to Figure 4, 
which illustrates the parametric regions of the types of equilibria that arise.  The regions of interest 
are defined by the following functions: 
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1
1( )
1 1
p pH x xδ δ δδ δ
− +⎛≡ ⎜− −⎝ ⎠
⎞− ⎟        (14) 
2
1( )
1 1
q pH x xδ δ δδ δ
− +⎛≡ ⎜− −⎝ ⎠
⎞− ⎟        (15) 
For notational simplicity, let 0σ  denote the strategy ( )kσ  when 0k = , that is, the probability of 
investment of a given firm in the initial investment game.  We can then state the following results 
(details of the proof are in the Appendix). 
 
Proposition 2.  The symmetric equilibrium of the investment game under the FP regime is given by 
the strategy profile 0 0( , )σ σ , where 0σ  satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) if , then 0/c ∆ > x 0 0σ = . 
(ii) if  and 0/c ∆ ≤ x ( )0 1c H c∆ > ∆ , then 0 0σ = . 
(iii) if and 0/c ∆ ≤ x ( )0 2c H c∆ < ∆  , then 0 1σ = . 
(iv) if , and 0/c ∆ ≤ x ( ) ( )2 0 1H c c H c∆ ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆ , then 00 ( )M M
p V c
p q V
δσ δ
−= − , 
where MV  is the value function, at the start of the first improvement game, for the patent holder who 
will be investing in every period (as derived in equation (1), with 1k = ). 
As one would expect, for a given value of c , relatively low values of initial R&D cost  will induce 
both firms to invest with probability one, as in part (iii) of Proposition 2. If the R&D cost parameters 
 and/or  are large enough (as in parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2), on the other hand, neither firm 
invests. For intermediate values of the R&D cost parameters, as exactly identified in part (iv) of 
Proposition 2, each firm would want to invest if the other does not. Thus, in addition to such pure-
strategy equilibria, here we have a (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium. Note that the mixed-
strategy equilibrium converges to a pure-strategy equilibrium in the appropriate limit: 
0c
c 0c
0 0σ →  as 
( )0 1c H c∆ → ∆  and 0 1σ →  as ( )0 2c H c∆ → ∆ . Thus, with respect to Figure 4, in equilibrium 
both firms randomize between investing and not when the parameter vector  lies in the 
area labeled “mixed strategies,” and both firms invest with probability one when the parameter vector 
lies in the area labeled “pure strategies.”       
0( / , / )c c∆ ∆
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2.4.2  Research Exemption Regime 
 The equilibrium of the investment game under the RE regime similarly depends on the relative 
magnitude of the R&D costs that characterize the initial innovation as opposed to the follow-on 
improvements. As derived earlier, under RE regime one can distinguish three intervals of values of 
 in which the strategy of the follower and the resulting equilibrium in the improvement stage is 
qualitatively different: 
/c ∆
2[0, ]x , 2 1[ , ]x x  and 1 0[ , ]x x . In what follows we will analyze the equilibrium 
of the initial stage in these cases. The various possibilities that arise are illustrated in Figure 5, where 
the parametric regions of interest are defined by the functions  and  defined earlier, and 
by the following functions: 
1( )H x 2 ( )H x
(3( ) 11
pH x x)δδ= −−         (16) 
4
(1 2 ) (2 )( )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
q q qH x x
p q p
pδ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ
− + −= −− + − + − +     (17) 
5 ( )
pH x x
q
=          (18) 
Functions  and  determine the threshold levels of  and the resulting strategy profiles 
for a given value of , and the function  does the same for the parametric region 
. The following proposition characterize the equilibrium of the investment game 
under the RE regime for all values of 
3 ( )H x 4 ( )H x 0c
2( / ) [0, ]c ∆ ∈ x
x
5 ( )H x
2 1( / ) [ , ]c x∆ ∈
1/c x∆ ≥ . 
 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that . Then the strategy profile 1/c ∆ ≥ x 0 0( , )σ σ  constitutes the symmetric 
equilibrium of the investment game under the research exemption regime i.f.f. 
(i) if , then 0/c ∆ > x 0 0σ = ; 
(ii) if 1 0/x c≤ ∆ ≤ x  and ( )0 1c H c∆ > ∆ , then 0 0σ = ; 
(iii) if 1 0/x c≤ ∆ ≤ x  and ( )0 1c H c∆ ≤ ∆ , then 00 ( )M M
p V c
p q V
δσ δ
−= − . 
The results of this proposition follow directly from observing that, as was shown in Proposition 1, 
when  the Follower does not invest at the improvement stage. This implies that payoffs of 
the Leader and the Follower are identical to the payoffs of the patent holder and of the firm that did 
not innovate under the FP regime, respectively. Therefore the resulting equilibrium must also be 
identical to the one obtained under the FP regime (see Proposition 2). It is also readily verified that 
1/c ∆ ≥ x
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2 1 1( )H x x= . This implies that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the investment game in this 
case.  
 Next we consider the interval 2 1[ , ]x x . Recall that in this case both the Leader and the Follower 
take part in the improvement game, but the payoff of the Follower is equal to zero.  The resulting 
equilibrium as the investment stage is characterized as follows.  
  
Proposition 4.  Suppose that 2 1/x c≤ ∆ ≤ x  and let 1 ( ,1)LV V σ≡  denote the payoff of the winner of 
the investment game (i.e., the first Leader), as given by equation (5). Then the strategy profile 
0 0( , )σ σ  constitutes the symmetric equilibrium of the investment game under the research exemption 
regime i.f.f. it satisfies the following conditions 
(i) if , then 0c = c 0 1σ = ; 
(ii) if ( )0 5c c H c∆ ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆ , then 1 00
1( )
p V c
p q V
δσ δ
−= − ; 
(iii) if ( )0 5c H c∆ > ∆ , then 0 0σ = . 
 
The proof of this result is given in the Appendix. Thus, in the initial investment game we can have an 
equilibrium in which both firms invest with probability one even if 2 /x c≤ ∆  (that is, even though, at 
the improvement stage, under these conditions the Follower will only play a mixed strategy). 
 Finally, consider the case 2( / ) [0, ]c x∆ ∈ , that is when both the Leader and the Follower invest 
with probability one in the improvement stage.   
 
Proposition 5.  Suppose that . Then the strategy profile 2/c ∆ ≤ x 0 0( , )σ σ  constitutes the symmetric 
equilibrium of the investment game under the research exemption regime i.f.f.  
(i) if ( )0 4c H c∆ ≤ ∆ , then 0 1σ =  
(ii)  if ( )0 3c H c∆ > ∆ , then 0 0σ =   
(iii)  if  and 1/c ∆ < x ( ) ( )4 0 3H c c H c∆ ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆ , then 00 1σ≤ ≤ .  
 
The proof of the proposition is given in the Appendix, where the quadratic equation defining 0σ  for 
part (iii) is also explicitly derived. With respect to Figure 5, therefore, pure strategies are used in the 
parameter regions labeled , and symmetric mixed strategies are used in regions , 1C A 1B  and .  As 2C
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one might expect, the equilibrium strategies in the initial game reflect the nature of equilibrium at the 
improvement stage. Recall that, in the improvement game, the Follower will not take part whenever 
.  If this condition is satisfied, once one of the firms succeeds in completing the first 
innovation step, its rival will immediately drop out of the race.  This type of equilibrium is similar to 
the one obtained by Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole (1983) in the context of race with a known 
finish line, and by Hörner (2004) in an infinite-horizon setting.  Specifically, the incentives to invest 
in R&D is highest when the firms compete for the entire market, i.e., when the winner of the initial 
game faces no competition afterwards. In particular, note that whenever , no investment 
takes place if .  But, when 
1/c ∆ > x
x
0x 0
1/c ∆ <
0 3/ (0)c H∆ ≥ = 1 /x c x< ∆ <  we can find a range of  such that 
 and still both firms invest with positive probability in equilibrium, as can be seen with the 
aid of Figure 5. The same conclusion applies to the case
0 /c ∆
0 /c ∆ ≥ 0x
12 /x c x< ∆ < , when the Leader faces a 
Follower which randomizes and does not invest with probability one in each period.  
 Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under the FT and RE regimes, we note that in the 
parameter regions  and 4C 4B  of Figure 5 we have no initial R&D investment under the RE regime, 
whereas the FP regime leads to some initial investment (given by the mixed-strategy equilibrium).  
Similarly, in regions   and 3C 3B  of Figure 5 we again have no initial R&D investment under the RE 
regime, whereas under the FP regime both firms invest with probability one in the initial game.  Thus, 
it is apparent that the presence of a RE clause unambiguously weakens the initial incentive of firms to 
invest in R&D.  The welfare consequences of this weakened investment incentives are analyzed next.  
 
 2.5 Welfare Analysis 
 Having characterized the MPE of the model, we can now turn the normative implications of the 
analysis.  We consider first the returns, from an ex ante perspective, to the two firms, and next derive 
the aggregate welfare of the economy.  
 
2.5.1.  Firms’ Expected Profit  
 The expected profit of the two firms at time zero, before the initial research investment  is 
made, depends on the particular equilibrium solution that applies to the region of the parameter space.  
The regions of interest (labeled , 
0c
A 1B  to 4B , and  to ) are illustrated in Figure 4.    Our 
findings are as follows. 
1C 4C
Proposition 6.    The firms’ expected profits under the FP regime are never lower, and can be strictly 
higher, than those under the RE regime.  Specifically: 
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(i) Firms’ expected profit under RE and FP regimes are the same if  ( )0 2/c H c∆ ≥ ∆ . 
(ii) Firms’ expected profit under the FP regime is higher than under the RE regime  
 (a) if 2 1/x c< ∆ < x  and ( )0 2/c H c∆ ≤ ∆ , 
 (b) if   and 2/c ∆ < x ( )0 2/c H c∆ ≤ ∆ . 
 
The domain of part (i) of this proposition encompasses the parameter space labeled as ,A 2B , 4B , and 
 in Figure 5.  In area A the firms have exactly the same equilibrium strategies under either regime 
(see Propositions 1, 2 and 3): in the improvement games only the Leader invests whenever 
4C
1c x∆ > .  
Consequently the firms have the same behavior in the initial game as well.  The firms’ equilibrium 
strategy is to invest with probability one in the parameter space of area  (earning a positive 
expected payoff). In the area  there is no investment in the initial game under the RE regime, 
whereas firms invest with a mixed strategy under the FP regime (but earn a zero expected payoff). In 
area 
A
4C
2B  firms randomize in the investment game under both regimes. Finally, in area 4B  there is a 
mixed strategy equilibrium under FP regime and none of the firms invests under the RE regime.  For 
the domain of part (ii)(a), ex ante expected profits are positive under FP regime and zero under RE 
regime (because none of the firms invests in the investment game in area 3B , and because firms firm 
randomize in area 1B ). The domain of part (ii)(b) encompasses areas , , and  in Figure 5.  
Consider are  first.  Under either regime both firms invest with probability one in both the 
investment game and the improvement games.  Because firms have the same probability of success, it 
follows that both firms prefer the FP regime, ex ante, i.f.f. 
1C 2C 3C
1C
M LV V V≥ + F . By using the expressions 
derived in Lemma 1 (for the case 1φ = ), this inequality is equivalent to: 
1 1
p q c
q
δ δ
δ δ δ
∆ ∆≥− − + −
0
        (19) 
which is clearly satisfied.  Turning to the parameter space comprising area , we note that here 
firms invest with probability one in the FP regime, whereas they randomize in the mixed strategy 
equilibria under the RE regime.  The expression for the expected profit of each firm under the FP 
regime solves the recursive equation 
2C
0 0 (1 2 )
FP F
MV c q V q Vδ= − + + − Pδ , and thus: 
 00 1 (1 2 )
FP Mq V cV
q
δ
δ
−= − − .        (20) 
whereas under the RE regime expected profit is given by 
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0
0
01 (1
RE Fp VV
)p
σ δ
δ σ= − −         (21) 
where 0σ  is the investment probability in the equilibrium mixed strategy. As shown in the Appendix, 
a sufficient condition for 0 0
FP RV V> E  holds.  Finally, for the parameter space of area , firms invest 
with probability one in the initial game and enjoy a positive profit, whereas there is no investment 
(and zero profit) under the RE regime.  
3C
 Thus, Proposition 6 establishes that firms, ex ante, would never prefer the RE regime over the 
FP regime.  This result differs from that of Bessen and Maskin (2002), where a (suitably defined) 
weaker patent system, in a similar sequential innovation setting, can produce higher ex ante returns to 
the innovating firms than a full patent system.  The root of that result is a complementarity 
assumption that is appealing in a sequential setting: the presence of a competitor increases the 
probability that future profitable innovations (improvements) may be undertaken (although it erodes 
the firm’s expected profit in a given stage innovation race).  The former effects counters the latter 
(standard) effect, and can lead to a firm benefiting from its innovation being used by others for future 
innovations.  A flavor of Bessen and Maskin’s complementarity assumption is certainly present in our 
model as well: prior to knowing the identity of the winner of the initial innovation stage, a RE may be 
appealing because it guarantees the possibility of taking part in future (profitable) innovation stages.  
But the specific structure of the IPR regimes that we have modeled, and the explicit requirement of a 
MPE solution, in our setting ensure that the FP protection is preferred ex ante by the firms.  
 
2.5.2  Welfare  
Because under the Bertrand pricing condition that we have used the sum of firms’ profits 
does not coincide with social welfare, we have to take into account consumer surplus when evaluating 
efficiency of patents and research exemptions. First we compute the expected social welfare starting 
at stage one of the improvement game. Let  denote this welfare measure when there are i  firms 
( ) investing (in equilibrium) in every period of the game, and let W
iW
1,2i = φ  denote the corresponding 
welfare measure when the Leader invests with probability one and the Follower invests with 
probability φ , evaluated at the beginning of the improvement game. Clearly  coincides with 
monopoly profits 
1W
MV  because the monopolist captures the entire surplus when it is the only one to 
invest in every period.  Hence,   
1 21 (1 )M
c pW V δδ δ
∆ − ∆≡ = +− − .       (22) 
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 On the other hand, the situation in which two firms invest in every period from the social point 
of view is the same as the situation in which there is a monopolist with cost  and success 
probability 2  that invests in every period. Hence the sum of firms’ profits and consumer surplus 
is equal to the profits of such a monopolist. Therefore, 
2c
q p>
2 2
2 2
1 (1 )
c qW δδ δ
∆ − ∆= +− − .        (23) 
The measure of social welfare when the Follower randomizes between investing and not can be 
shown to be given by the following expression (see Appendix for an explicit derivation): 
  2
(1 ) ( 2 (1 ) )
1 (1 )
c qWφ
pφ φ δ φ δ
δ δ
∆ − + ∆ + −= +− −       (24)  
Note that, as one would expect, when 0φ =  we have 1W Wφ = , and when 1φ =  we have 2W Wφ = . 
Similarly to the analysis of the equilibrium of the investment game, we will compare welfare under 
the two IPR regimes in the three possible cases: 2( / ) [0, ]c x∆ ∈ ,  and 
. Note that for the case 
2 1( / ) [ , ]c x∆ ∈ x
x1 0( / ) [ , ]c x∆ ∈ 1 0( / ) [ , ]c x x∆ ∈ , we have shown that the equilibrium 
strategies of firms are exactly the same in both regimes. This implies that the social payoffs are equal. 
It turns out that in the two remaining cases it is possible to characterize social welfare ranking only 
for a subset of the domain of possible values of ( )0/ , /c c∆ ∆ . We present these analytic results in the 
following two propositions and then perform numerical analysis of the remaining cases. 
 
Proposition 7.  Suppose that . The social payoffs under the RE and FP regimes are 
related as follows:  
2/ [0,c ∆∈ ]x
(i) If ( ) ( )3 0 2H c c H c∆ < ∆ < ∆ , then the FP regime yields higher welfare.  
(ii)  If ( )0 4c H c∆ ≤ ∆ , then 
 (a)  if (1 )(2 ) (1 )p p δ δ− − ≥ − , the RE regime yields a higher welfare. 
 (b) if (1 )(2 ) (1 )p p δ δ− − < − , the FP regime gives higher social welfare if  
  0(1 )p x c x− < ∆ ≤ 1  but the RE regime yields higher welfare if  00 (1c p)x≤ ∆ ≤ − . 
For the case of part (i), with FP protection both firms invest with probability one; hence, the social 
payoff is positive and greater than the social payoff with the RE (which is zero because none of the 
firms invests in equilibrium).  For part (ii), here both firms invest with probability one in both 
investment and improvement games. The question of whether the RE is better than the FP regime is 
essentially the same as the question of whether it is better to have two firms (as under the RE regime) 
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or one firm (as under the FP regime) in the improvement game.  Thus, the RE regime yields higher 
welfare i.f.f.   , that is whenever 2W W≥ 1
  0(1 ) 1
c p x
p
δ
δ≤ ≡∆ − −         (25) 
We know that in this region  . We conclude that in this region the RE regime will yield a 
higher welfare as long as parameter values satisfy the following inequality: 
1/c ∆ < x
0 1
(1 )(1 )
1 1
p p qp x x
q
δ δ
δ δ δ
−− ≡ ≥ ≡− − +   ⇔   (1 )(2 ) (1 )p p δ δ− − ≥ − .   (26) 
 
Proposition 8.  Suppose that . The social payoffs under the RE and FP regimes are 
related as follows:  
2 1/ [ ,c x x∆∈ ]
(i) For all values of ( )0/ , /c c∆ ∆  that satisfy the condition ( ) ( )5 0 2H c c H c∆ < ∆ < ∆  (region 3B ) 
the FP regime yields higher welfare.  
(ii) For all values of ( )0/ , /c c∆ ∆  that satisfy the condition ( ) ( )2 0 5H c c H c∆ < ∆ < ∆  (region 2B ) 
the RE regime yields higher welfare. 
(iii) For all values of ( )0/ , /c c∆ ∆  that satisfy ( ) ( ){ } ( )2 5 0 1max ,H c H c c H c∆ ∆ < ∆ < ∆ , that is 
region 4B , there is no difference in welfare between the two IP regimes. 
 
For the parameter region of part (i), with FP protection both firms invest with probability one; hence, 
the social payoff is positive and greater than the social payoff with the RE, which is equal to zero 
because none of the firms invests in equilibrium.  For part (ii) firms randomize in the investment 
game under both IP regimes. Even though expected profits are zero under both IP regimes, RE regime 
yields a higher welfare because firms do not appropriate the whole consumer surplus (under our 
Bertrand pricing assumption).  Finally, for part (iii) firms randomize under FP regime (earning zero 
expected profit), and there is no investment under RE regime. We conclude that welfare is equal to 
zero in both cases. 
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2.5.3  An Illustration 
 Propositions 8 and 9 do not say anything conclusive about the welfare ranking of the two IPR 
regimes when the parameters of interest fall in areas  and 2C 1B  of Figure 5. It turns out that either 
welfare ranking is possible in these areas, depending on parameter values. That much can easily be 
established by deriving explicit expressions for the welfare functions of interest that are then 
numerically evaluated for alternative parameter values. Suppose that both firms invest with 
probability 0σ  in the investment game and, as before, the social welfare in the improvement game is 
 ( ) or WiW 1,2i = φ . Then the expected social payoff of the whole game is defined by the following 
recursive equation: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
0 0 0 0 0 0
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( ) 2 2 (1 2 )
2 1 (1 ) 1
i
i
V c q W q V
c p W p V V
σ σ δ δ σ
0σ σ δ δ σ σ δ
= − + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
+ − − + + − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ σ
 (27) 
yielding (upon some simplification): 
( ) ( )( )
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0
2 2
1 1 2 (1 )
ip p W cV
p q
σ σ δ σσ δ σ σ σ
− −= − − − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
     (28) 
Therefore, the social welfare measures under the FP and RE regimes are given by, respectively, 
1
0
(2 ) 2(1)
1 2
FP 0p p W cW V
q
δ
δ δ
− −= = − +       (29) 
( ) ( )( )
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0
2 2
1 1 2 (1 )
iRE p p W cW V
p q
σ σ δ σσ δ σ σ σ
− −= = ⎡ ⎤− − − +⎣ ⎦
    (30) 
where is equal to  or WiW 2W φ , depending on the equilibrium of the improvement game, and 0σ  is 
the corresponding equilibrium probability of investment in the initial stage. 
 These welfare functions can now be compared for any given set of parameter values (upon 
calculation of the equilibrium mixed strategy parameter 0σ ).  Consider for example  (without 
loss of generality), and suppose that 
1∆ =
0.5p =  and 0.8δ = .8  The welfare comparison of the two IPR 
regimes that we obtain in this case is summarized in Figure 6 where, for concreteness, the various 
regions are drawn to scale (i.e., given 0.5p =  and 0.8δ = ).   The un-shaded regions in Figure 6 
                                         
8 These parameter values broadly reflect the nature of plant breeding, where the probability of success 
of a research program may be good, but where it usually takes several years to bring a new variety to 
the market.  For example, 0.8δ =  corresponds to a research period of five years if the annual 
discount rate is approximately equal to 4.5 percent. 
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(labeled E  ) represent the parameter space where the FP and RE regimes are equivalent in terms of 
social welfare. In the rightmost portion of this parameter space (region A in Figure 5) there is no 
difference in welfare because the equilibrium is the same under the two intellectual property regimes. 
In the other portion of this parameter space welfare equivalence results because no investment takes 
place under the RE regime, whereas under the FP regime all the surplus is competed away by the two 
firms (who engage in a mixed strategy equilibrium in the initial investment game).  In the red colored 
regions of Figure 6, labeled FP , the full patent regime is better from the social point of view; these 
regions correspond to parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 7, part (i) of Proposition 8 and the conclusions 
of the analysis of regions  and 2C 1B  discussed in the foregoing. Finally, in the blue colored regions 
of Figure 6, labeled RE , the RE regime dominates patents from the social point of view. These 
regions were described in part (ii) of Proposition 7 and part (ii) of Proposition 8 and in the context of 
the analysis of regions  and 2C 1B .  
 The fact that the parameter space in which the RE regimes dominates is disjoint exhibits one 
the simplifying features of our model.  Specifically, the assumption that the entire surplus created by 
the innovation can be extracted by a monopolist patent holder means that there is no residual 
consumer surplus in region 2B ; and, in this region there is no expected profit either under the FP 
regime, although some investment takes place,  because the mixed-strategy equilibria competes away 
all the expected profit. Under the RE regimes firms earn zero initial expected profits (they also play a 
mixed strategy in both the initial and the improvement games).  But given the Bertrand pricing 
assumption, consumers can capture some of the benefits of innovation here, and thus the RE regimes 
dominates the FP regime in this region.  In other words, the limited avenue for R&D benefit spillover 
to consumers that we allow in our model somewhat slants the comparison in favor of the RE regime.  
Whereas this result underlies a limiting feature of the model (which could, of course, be relaxed, at 
the cost of making the characterization of the results even more cumbersome), it does reinforce the 
significance of the parameter space where we have shown that the FP regimes dominates.  
 
2.5.4 On Licensing 
 In this paper we have assumed that, under both intellectual property regimes, no licensing takes 
place between competing firms.  The type of licensing that we might consider here is for the right to 
carry out R&D (there is clearly no incentive for the Leader and patent holder to license the right to 
produce).  Because licensing was a central theme of some earlier cumulative innovation models (e.g., 
Green and Scotchmer, 1995), it might be useful to articulate how licensing would affect our results.  
First note that, unlike some other quality ladder models in this area, here we have assumed that ideas 
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are not scarce in that both the initial innovator and the other firm can pursue the follow-on innovation.  
But we have also implicitly assumed that firms can operate only one project at a time (i.e., each firm 
has a given stock of R&D capabilities), so that in principle licensing the ability to perform product-
improving R&D might be useful. 
 Under the RE regime, it is clear that there is no scope for licensing because the lagging firm has 
free access to the latest innovation for R&D purposes (or, to put it differently, follow-on innovations 
are patentable and non-infringing). Under the FP regime, on the other hand, the winner of the initial 
game would find it profitable to license the right to innovate if the monopoly profit from investing in 
the two separate projects is higher than the profit from a single project.  In fact, because in our setting 
the monopolist captures the entire surplus from innovation, this condition is equivalent to whether it 
is better, from the social point of view, to have one or two firms engaged in R&D.9  In part (ii) of 
Proposition 7 we have shown that two firms are better than one i.f.f. 0(1 )p x c− ≥ ∆ . Therefore, in 
this domain, licensing could occur. Because in our setting the monopolist fully internalizes the social 
benefit of innovation, allowing for licensing arrangements would improve the welfare properties of 
the FP regime, without affecting the nature of the equilibrium under the RE regime.  We should 
conclude, therefore, that if licensing were allowed in this model the FP regime would weakly 
dominate the RE in every case. But we caution against this overly strong conclusion.  In our model it 
is not particularly meaningful to consider licensing because we do not explicitly model an asymmetric 
information structure, a feature that has been shown to be critical in the licensing of technology, 
especially in a cumulative innovation setting (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Bessen, 2004).   
 
 2.6 Conclusion 
 Recent court decisions have renewed interest, both in the United States and abroad, in the 
question of whether patent law reform should include a statutory research exemption (Merrill, Levin 
and Myers, 2004; Thomas, 2004; Rimmer, 2005).  Conversely, for the case of plant breeder’s rights 
(an intellectual property right system that already possesses a well-defined research exemption), there 
has been considerable debate on whether the access provided by the research exemption should be 
curtailed (Le Buanec, 2004).  Little economic research on this feature of intellectual property rights 
exists, however.  In this paper we attempt to fill this gap in the policy analysis of intellectual property 
rights by studying the welfare properties of the research exemption and its ability to provide 
                                         
9 The presumption that firms can carry out only one project at a time rules out the “invariance” effect 
of Sah and Stiglitz (1987).  
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incentives for R&D investment when the innovation process is sequential and cumulative.  We 
develop a dynamic model of production and R&D competition in which the cost of the initial 
innovation effort differs from the cost of subsequent improvements. In this framework we derive 
explicit solutions for the Markov perfect equilibria of the investment and improvement games and 
analyze the social welfare properties of full patent and research exemption regimes.  
 Among the findings of the paper, it turns out that the firms themselves always prefer (ex ante) 
the full patent protection regime.  The social ranking of the two intellectual property regimes, on the 
other hand, depends on the relative magnitudes of costs of initial innovation and improvements. In 
particular, there exists a range of improvement cost parameters in which the social ordering of the two 
regimes depends on the magnitude of the initial innovation cost: for low values of this initial cost the 
research exemption regime yields a higher welfare, whereas when the initial cost is large the full 
patent regime is optimal from the social point of view. This implies that the research exemption is 
most likely to provide inadequate incentives when there is a large cost to establishing a research 
program, as is arguably the case for the plant breeding industry (where developing a new variety 
typically takes several years). On the other hand, when both initial and improvement costs are small 
relative to the expected profits (perhaps the case of the software industry noted by Bessen and 
Maskin, 2002), the weaker incentive to innovate is immaterial (firms engage in R&D anyway) and the 
research exemption regime results in a higher social payoff.  
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2.8 Figures 
Figure 1.  Stages, states, and implied games under the “research exemption”  
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Figure 2.  Types of Markov perfect equilibria in the improvement games 
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Figure 3.  Equilibrium payoffs in the improvement games 
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Figure 4. Equilibrium with “full patent” protection 
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Figure 5. Equilibrium with the “research exemption” 
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Figure 6. Welfare comparisons (case of 0.8δ =  and 0.5p = ) 
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2.9 Appendix 
2.9.1 Proof of Lemma 1 
Consider the situation where the Leader invest with probability one in every period, whereas the 
follower invest with the same probability [ ]0,1φ ∈  in every period (i.e., ( ) 1L kσ =  and ( )F kσ =v , 
). As in the text, the value to the Follower is written as k∀ FV  (this value is independent of the state), 
whereas for the Leader we simplify the notation and write ( )( ), ( ),k L L FV V k k kσ σ≡ .  From the 
recursive equations in (2) and (3) we have: 
 [ ] [ ]1 1(1 2 ) +(1 ) (1 )k k F k kV k c q V q V q V p V p Vφ δ δ δ φ δ δ+ += ∆ − + + + − − + − k  (31) 
 1 (1 ) (1 )
L
F FV c q V q V FVδ δ⎡ ⎤= − + + − + −⎣ ⎦v δv      (32) 
Hence, for the Leader we have 
  1 1,2,...k kV k V kα β γ += + + =        
where the parameters α , β  and γ  are defined as follows: 
( )1 (1 2 ) (1 )(1 )F
c q V
q p
δα δ δ
− +≡ − − − − −
v
v v
 
( )1 (1 2 ) (1 )(1 )q pβ δ δ
∆≡ − − − − −v v  
( )
(1 ) 1
1 (1 2 ) (1 )(1 )
q p
q p
δ δγ δ δ
+ −≡ <− − − − −
v v
v v
 . 
Assuming that the following convergence condition holds, 
         (33) lim 0n k nn
Vγ +→∞ →
the general solution to the value of the leader can be written as 
 21 1 (1 )k
kV α β βγγ γ γ= + +− − −  .       (34) 
Note that, by using (34), the term in the convergence condition (33) reduces to: 
21 1 1(1 )
n n
k n
kV nα βγ β β nγ γ γγ γγ+
⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟− − −−⎝ ⎠ γ
 . 
Given that 1γ < , it follows that , and also that , so that  (33) 
holds.  From the previous definitions of the parameters 
0 as n nγ → → ∞ ∞0 as nn nγ → →
α , β  and γ , it then follows  
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( )
( )2
(1 )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
F
k
q pc q V kV
q q q
δδ
δ δ δ
∆ + −− + ∆= + +− − − − − −
v vv
v v v
    (35) 
This expression is conditional on FV , which satisfies (32). But for 1k =  we have: 
 
( )
1
1 1 2 (1 )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
F q pc q VV
q q q
δδ
δ δ δ
− − − −⎡ ⎤− + ∆= + ⎢ ⎥− − − − − −⎣ ⎦
v vv
v v v
   (36) 
Upon solving the system of equations given by (32) and (36) we obtain: 
 
[ ]( )
( )
( )
( )1
1 1 (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 1 (1 2 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 2 )
c q p
V
q q
δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
− − − + ∆ −∆= + +− − − − − − −
v v v
v v
   (37) 
 [ ]( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 (1 (1 ) )1 (1 2 (1 ) )
(1 ) 1 (1 2 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 2 )F
c qq q p
V
q q
δδ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
⎛ ⎞− − +∆ − − − −= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − − − − − − −⎝ ⎠
vv v
v
v v vq
L
  (38) 
Equations (35) and (38) contain the results claimed in Lemma 1.   
 
2.9.2 Proof of Proposition 1 
Part (i). If both firms invest in every period, then, from the recursive equations (2) and (3), their 
value functions are given by 
( , ) ( , 1) (1 2 ) ( , )L F LV k k c q V q V k q V kσ δ δ σ δ σ= ∆ − + + + + −    (39) 
( )( ,1) 1F LV c q V q VFδ σ= − + + − δ       (40) 
Consider the Leader first, and suppose that now the Leader deviates by not investing in state s . Then 
his expected payoff is  
  ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
1 (1 )
F
L F L L
s p VV s s p V p V s V s
p
δσ δ δ σ σ δ
∆ += ∆ + + − ⇒ = − −   (41) 
Here ˆ ˆ( , )L Fσ σ σ=  and ˆ ( ) ( )L Lk kσ σ=  for all k s≠ .  Assume that 1s = .  Then the one-stage 
deviation under consideration would be profitable i.f.f. ˆ( ,1) ( ,1)L LV Vσ σ≥ .  From Lemma 1, when 
 and both firms invest in every period, the value functions of Leader and Follower reduce to 1k =
( )( ,1) 1L
cV σ δ
∆ −= −         (42) 
( ) ( )(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )F
qV
q
cδσ δ δ δ
∆= − − − −−       (43) 
By using these expressions and (41), we find that ˆ( ,1) ( ,1)L LV Vσ σ≥  i.f.f. 
1 (1
c p
q)
δ
δ≤∆ − −         (44) 
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For the purposes of part (i) of Proposition 1 we observe that 
2 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
q px
q q
δ δ
δ δ≡ <− − − −  .       (45) 
Therefore we conclude that deviating by not investing in state 1s =  cannot be profitable for the 
Leader when 2c ∆ ≤ x . Since not investing in state 1s =  yields a strictly lower payoff to the Leader, 
the Leader will not choose this action with positive probability in any arbitrary deviation when the 
lead is equal to one. Hence we conclude that the Leader has no profitable deviation in this state.  
Next, by using equation (5) of Lemma 1 we can write  
( ) ( )
( )ˆ ˆ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , ) ( , )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )L L L L
p qV s V s V s V s
q p
δσ σ σ σ δ δ
∆ −+ − + = − + − − − −  (46) 
If ˆ( ,1) ( ,1)L LV Vσ σ≥ , then, because , it follows by induction that p q> ˆ( , ) ( , ),L LV k V k kσ σ≥ ∀ . 
Thus, the Leader does not have a profitable deviation at any stage.  Next consider the Follower.  
Conditional on the Leader investing in every period, the value to the Follower of investing in every 
period is FV  as given by (43), whereas the value of deviating to not investing in the first stage is 
( ) ( )ˆF FV Vσ δ σ= . Hence, ˆ( ) ( )F FV Vσ σ≥  whenever  which, from (43), is equivalent to 0FV ≥
( ) 21 (1 )c q qδ δ∆ ≤ − − ≡ x . 
Part (ii). Because the value of being a Follower does not depend on the state  of the game, the 
follower can follow the same stationary strategy at all states. Thus, consider the candidate equilibrium 
profile 
k
σ  where   Let ( ) ,F k kσ φ= ∀  and ( ) 1,L k kσ = ∀ , where [ ]0,1∈v . From part (i), 1=v  i.f.f. 
( ) 21 (1 )c q qδ δ∆ ≤ − − ≡ x . For 2c x∆ <  and close enough to 2x  suppose that ( )0,1∈v .  Then, in 
any one stage, the Follower must be indifferent between actions  and  (given that the rest of the 
game accords with the strategy profile 
I N
σ ), that is I NF FV V=  where 
  1 (1 )
I
F FV c q V q Vδ δ= − + + −  
  NF FV Vδ=  
By using the expressions derived in Lemma 1, we find that I NF FV V=  requires v  to solve the 
quadratic equation (11). Note that s 1→v  a 2c x∆ →  and s 0→v  a 1xc ∆ →
k
.  By construction, the 
Follower does not have a one-stage profitable deviation from ( ) ,F kσ φ= ∀ .  As for the Leader, the 
value of ( ) 1,L k kσ = ∀  when the Follower plays ( ) ,F k kσ φ= ∀  is given by ( , )LV kσ  in Lemma 1. 
Deviating at stage s  only by choosing action   at that stage yields payoff N
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ˆ( , ) (1 ) ( , )L FV k k p V p V kLσ δ δ= ∆ + + −v v σ  
Because, as shown, in the postulated mixed strategy equilibrium the Follower’s payoff is 0FV = , 
ˆ( , ) ( , )L LV k V kσ σ≥  holds as long as ( )( , ) 1 (1 )LV k k qσ δ≥ ∆ − −v  which, by using the result of 
Lemma 1, is equivalent to 
( )(1 )
1 (1 )
q pc
q
δ
δ
+ −≤∆ − −
v v
v
        (47) 
This inequality can be shown to hold for all [ ]0,1∈v  that solve equation (11).  Because equation (11) 
applies to 2 1x c≤ ∆ ≤ x , then in this domain the Leader does not have a profitable deviation from 
( ) 1,L k kσ = ∀ . 
Part (iii). If ( ) 0,F k kσ = ∀ , then the situation is isomorphic to that of the FP protection environment 
and, as established earlier, it is indeed optimal for the Leader to invest whenever 0c ∆ ≤ x
k
.  Given 
( ) 1,L kσ = ∀ , it follows from the proof of part (ii)  that the Follower does not have a profitable one-
stage deviation when away 1x c< ∆ .  
Part (iv). If the firms play according to the strategy profile ( ) ( ) 0,L Fk k kσ σ= = ∀ , then the payoffs 
are given by ( ,1)
1L
V σ δ
∆= −  and ( ) 0FV σ = . Suppose that the Leader considers the strategy ˆ ( )L kσ  
such that ˆ (1) 1Lσ =  and ˆ ( ) ( ) 0, 1L Lk k kσ σ= = ∀ >  (i.e., the Leader deviates by investing in state 
 only). Then the Leader’s expected payoff can be written as 1k =
  ˆ( , ,1) ( , ,1)
1L L F L L F
V V c pσ σ σ σ δ δ
∆= − + −      (48) 
Thus, ˆ( , ,1) ( , ,1) 0L L F L L FV Vσ σ σ σ− >  holds i.f.f. (1 ) 0p cδ δ∆ − − > , that is i.f.f. .  We 
conclude that the Leader has no profitable one-state deviation in this case.  Now, for the Follower, 
consider the strategy 
0/c ∆ < x
ˆ ( )F kσ  such that ˆ (1) 1Fσ =  and ˆ ( ) ( ) 0, 1F Fk k kσ σ= = ∀ >  (i.e., the Follower 
deviates by investing in state  only).  Then his expected payoff is given by 1k =
  ˆ( , ) ( , )
1F L F F L F
V V c pσ σ σ σ δ δ
∆= − + −      (49) 
and again we find that ˆ( , ) ( , ) 0F L F F L FV Vσ σ σ σ− >  ⇔  0/c x∆ < . 
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 2.9.3 Proof of Proposition 2  
Part (i). We will show that for each firm it is optimal not to invest, given that its rival does not invest.  
The winner of the investment game would obtain a payoff equal to (1 )δ∆ − , so that the payoff from 
investing in the initial game while the other firm does not invest is 
  ( )0 0 0 0 0
1(1 )
1 1 (1 )
pV c p p V V c
p
δδ δδ δ
∆ ∆⎛ ⎞= − + + − ⇒ = −⎜ ⎟− − − ⎝ ⎠1 δ− .  (50) 
Therefore such a firm will invest i.f.f.   
  0 01
p cδδ
∆ − ≥−   ⇔
0
1
cp cδ
δ ≥ ≥− ∆ ∆ . 
Because here 0x c< ∆ , the best response of such firm is not to invest. 
Part (ii). We will show that no firm can deviate profitably by switching to 0 1σ = .  Because 
 by assumption, the payoff of the winner of the investment game is given by the 0/c ∆ ≤ x MV  of 
equation (1) (with ). Consider the payoff to the firm from playing 1k = 0 1σ =  given that its rival 
plays 0 0σ = .  This satisfies  
  0 0 (1 )MV c p V p V0δ δ= − + + −        (51) 
Therefore such a firm will find it profitable to i.f.f.  
  00
10
1 (1 ) 1 1
M 0p V c cp p cV
p
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
− − +⎛= ≥ ⇔ −⎜− − − − ∆ ∆⎝ ⎠
⎞ ≥⎟
0
    (52) 
Part (iii). Consider the situation in which both firms invest with probability one. Then each firm’s 
value function is given by 
  0 0 (1 2 )MV c q V q Vδ δ= − + + −        (53) 
Because the firm that does not innovate obtains a zero payoff, both firms invest in equilibrium if  
  0 00
10
1 (1 2 ) 1 1
Mq V c cq p cV
q
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
− − +⎛= ≥ ⇔ −⎜− − − − ∆ ∆⎝ ⎠
⎞ ≥⎟    (54) 
Part (iv). Because here we have ( )0 1c H c∆ ≤ ∆ , we know from (ii) that in the absence of 
competition each firm will find it profitable to invest. On the other hand, since ( )0 2c H c∆ ≥ ∆ , we 
know from (iii) that if its rival is investing a firm will find it profitable not to invest. This implies that 
there exist two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this domain, which require the two firms to behave 
asymmetrically. But there also exist a pair of mixed strategies which, because of their symmetry, may 
be more appealing. To compute the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, suppose that firm 2 
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randomizes between investing and not with probability 0σ . Then the payoff of firm 1, conditional on 
investing or not investing, respectively, satisfies the following recursive equations:  
  ( ) ( )1 10 0 0 0 0(1 2 ) (1 ) (1 )M MV q V q V p V p Vσ δ δ σ δ δ= + − + − + − 1 0c−   (55) 
  ( )1 10 0 0 0(1 ) 1V p V 10Vσ δ σ= − + − δ
0
      (56) 
From (56) it follows that . In a non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium each firm is 
indifferent between its two (pure) strategies.  Hence, the second firm’s equilibrium mixing probability 
must satisfy 
1
0 0V =
  0 0(1 ) 0M Mq V p V cσ δ σ δ+ − − =  ⇔  00 ( )
M
M
p V c
p q V
δσ δ
−= − .   
 
2.9.4 Proof of Proposition 4 
If both firms invest with probability one in the investment game, then the value function of each firm 
is given by 
 0 0 1 (1 2 )V c q V q V0δ δ= − + + −  ⇔  1 00 1 (1 2 )
q V cV
q
δ
δ
−= − − . 
On the other hand, if only one firm invests, then its value function is given by 
 0 0 1 (1 ) 0
I IV c p V p Vδ δ= − + + −  ⇔  1 00 1 (1 )
I p V cV
p
δ
δ
−= − −  
and the value function of the firm that does not invest ( ) is equal to zero. Therefore, both firms 
invest in equilibrium if and only if , that is 
0
NV
0 0
NV V≥ 1 0 0
1 (1 2 )
q V c
q
δ
δ
− ≥− − .  The last expression can be 
written as 1q V c0δ ≥ .  By using equation (9), which implies that  1 ( ,1) ( )LV V c qσ δ= = , we can write 
this last condition simply as:  .  By assumption we are limiting consideration to the case 0c c≥ 0c c≤ , 
therefore firms will invest with probability one only when 0c c= . On the other hand, none of the 
firms invests in equilibrium if 0 0
IV < , that is  1 0 0
1 (1 )
p V c
p
δ
δ
− <− − .  The last expression is equivalent 
to 1p V c0δ < , or 
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 05
cc p cH
q
⎛ ⎞ ≡ <⎜ ⎟∆ ∆⎝ ⎠ ∆  
Note that this implies that  is a linear function with 5 ( )H x 5 1 1 1( ) ( )H x H x=  and 5 2 3 2( ) ( )H x H x=  
(see Figure 5).  Finally, if ( )0 5c c H c∆ < ∆ ≤ ∆  then both firms must randomize in a symmetric 
equilibrium. In such a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, if the second firm invests with 
probability 0σ , then for the first firm to be indifferent between investing and not we must have 
 0 1 0 1 0(1 ) 0q V p V cσ δ σ δ+ − − =  ⇔  1 00
1( )
p V c
p q V
δσ δ
−= − .  
 
2.9.5 Proof of Proposition 5   
Part (i). If both firms invest with probability one in the investment game, then the value function of 
each firm is given by 
  0 0 (1 2 )L FV c q V q V q V0δ δ δ= − + + + −  ⇔   00 ( )1 (1 2 )
L Fq V V cV
q
δ
δ
+ −= − −   (57) 
On the other hand, if only one firm invests, then its value function is given by 
  0 0 0(1 )
I I
Lp V p V  ⇔  00 1 (1 )
I Lp V cV
p
δ
δ
−= − −     (58) V c δ δ= − + + −
and the value function of the firm that does not invest is given by 
   0 0(1 )
N N
FV p V p Vδ δ= + − ⇔  0 1 (1 )
N Fp VV
p
δ
δ= − − .   (59) 
Therefore, both firms invest in equilibrium if and only if  
    0 0
NV V≥ ⇔ 0( )
1 (1 2 ) 1 (1 )
L F Fq V V c p V
q p
δ δ
δ δ
+ − ≥− − − −  
By using the expressions for LV  and FV  derived earlier, the last expression can be re-arranged to 
yield the claimed parametric domain.  
Part (ii). Suppose that a firm faces a rival that does not invest. From (v) we know that such a firm 
will find it profitable to invest i.f.f.  
0
0 01 (1 )
I Lp V cV
p
δ
δ
−= ≥− − ⇔       0
( )
1
p c cδ δ
∆ − ≥−     ⇔    ( )0 3c H c∆ ≤ ∆ .  (60) 
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Part (iii).  The results in (i) and (ii) imply that in this case a firm that faces no rival will find it 
optimal to invest. On the other hand if the rival is investing, then it is optimal not to invest. It is clear 
that the symmetric equilibrium must involve mixed strategies. To compute them, suppose that one of 
the firms invests in each period of the investment stage with probability 0 [0,1]σ ∈ . In equilibrium its 
rival must be indifferent between investing and not. In particular, we have 
  ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0 0(1 2 ) 1 (1 )I I IL F LV c q V q V q V c p V pσ δ δ δ σ δ δ= − + + + − + − − + + − V  
  0 0 00
0
( (1 ) )
1 (1 )(1 )
I L Fq p V q VV
p p
0cσ σ δ σ δ
δ σ
+ − + −⇔ = − − −     (61) 
and 
  ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0(1 ) 1N N NFV p V Vσ δ δ σ δ= + − + −V p 00
01 (1 )
N Fp VV
p
σ δ
δ σ⇔ = − −  (62) 
The equilibrium mixing probability must satisfy  0 0
I NV V= , implying 
   0 0 0 0 0
0 0
( (1 ) )
1 (1 )(1 ) 1 (1 )
L F Fq p V q V c p V
p p p
σ σ δ σ δ σ δ
δ σ δ σ
+ − + − =− − − − −     (63) 
This defines a quadratic equation in 0σ  of the form 20 0 0a b eσ σ⋅ + ⋅ + = , where  
2 ( )( ) 0<L Fa p p q V Vδ≡ − − −        (64) 
( ) 0( ) (3 1) (1 )L Fb p q V V cδ δ δ≡ − − − + −⎡⎣ p⎤⎦      (65) 
0(1 )( )Le p V c 0≥         (66) δ δ≡ − −
and where FV  and ( ,1)L LV V σ≡  are given by equations (4) and (9), respectively. The equilibrium 
mixing probability is the root of this equation that belongs to the unit interval.  
 
2.9.6 Completion of the Proof of Proposition 6 
Note that(21) is monotonically increasing in 0σ , achieving its maximum on [  at 0,1] 0 1σ = .  Thus, a 
sufficient condition for FP RΠ > Π E  in this case is: 
 0
1 (1 2 ) 1 (1 )
M Fq V c p V
q p
δ δ
δ δ
− >− − − −    ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 1 (1 ) 1 (1 2 )M Fq V c p p V qδ δ δ⇒ − − − > − − δ (67) 
provided  is such that we still are in region D, that is  0c ( )0 311
c p c H cδδ
⎛ ⎞≤ − ≡ ∆⎜ ⎟∆ − ∆⎝ ⎠ .  
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The LHS of the inequality in (67) is decreasing in , so take the upper value 0c 0 11
p cc δδ
∆ ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟− ∆⎝ ⎠ .  
Recalling the expressions for MV  and FV  (equation (1) and Lemma 1), and evaluating it at 0c , the 
inequality of interest reduces to: 
 [ ]( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )2
1 (1 )
( )( )(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 2 )
1 1 (1 )(1 )
c q q
q p c qp p p q
q
δ δδ δ δ δ δ δδ
⎡ ⎤− − − + ∆− ∆ − − + ∆ − − > − −⎢ ⎥− − −− ⎣ ⎦
δ  
Note that the LHS is increasing in c  and the RHS is decreasing in .  Hence, evaluate both at the 
lower bound , so that the resulting sufficient condition simplifies to:  
c
0c =
 ( )( ) ( ) ((2 )1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 1 (1 2 )
(1 )
p )p q q
p
δδ δ δ δδ
−− − − − > − − −+ −  
It is now verified that the inequality is always satisfied because, given that  and (0,1)p∈ (0,1)δ ∈ , 
we have (2 ) (1 )p pδ δ− < + −  and   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 1 (1 2 )p q qδ δ δ δ− − − − > − − −   (1 )( ) 0p q pqδ δ⇔ − − + > .      
 
2.9.7 Derivation of the function Wφ  
Suppose that the leader invests in all periods, and the follower invests with probability φ  in each 
period and let denote the expected total surplus at stage . Then we have  ( )W kφ k
( ) (1 ) 2 ( 1) (1 2 ) ( ) (1 ) ( 1) (1 ) ( )W k k c q W k q W k p W k p W kφ φ φ φφ φ δ δ φ δ δ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= ∆ − + + + + − − + + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣+ φ ⎤⎦   
This can be written as follows 
( ) ( 1) 1,2,...W k k W k kφ φα β γ= + + + =  
where the parameters α , β  and γ  are defined as: 
( )
(1 )
1 (1 2 ) (1 )(1 )
c
q p
φα φδ φ
− +≡ − − − − − δ  
( )1 (1 2 ) (1 )(1 )q pβ φδ φ
∆≡ − − − − − δ  
( )
2 (1 ) 1
1 (1 2 ) (1 )(1 )
q p
q p
φ δ φ δγ φδ φ δ
+ −≡ <− − − − −   
The general solution to the value of the leader can be written as: 
 2( ) 1 1 (1 )
kW kφ
α β βγ
γ γ γ= + +− − −  . 
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By using the definitions of the parameters α , β  and γ   given above, and simplifying for the case 
, yields: 1k =
2
(1 ) ( 2 (1 ) )(1)
1 (1 )
c q pW Wφ φ
φ φ δ φ δ
δ δ
∆ − + ∆ + −= +− − ≡ . 
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CHAPTER 3. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CROP IMPROVING R&D 
UNDER ADAPTIVE DESTRUCTION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Many commercially produced crops suffer significant yield reductions caused by pests 
and crop diseases. According to recent estimates, the damage in the U.S. agricultural sector 
ranges between $2 billion and $7 billion per year, with an additional $1.2 billion spent on various 
crop protection measures (Palumbi, 2001). Even though the development of biotechnology has 
led to the invention of innovative solutions in the fight against pests, it seems that no permanent 
solution to this problem is possible. The evolution of pest species inevitably leads to the 
emergence of resistance in the pest population, which then results in an increase in crop losses 
over time. 
The dynamics of this process raises the question of which government policies may 
improve the outcome from efficiency and social welfare points of view. In particular, it is 
sometimes argued that farmers may lack incentives to take into account the consequences of their 
pest management practices, including planting decisions. For this reason, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency has introduced in some cases (in particular in the cases of Bt cotton and Bt 
corn) regulations that require farmers to plant at least some of their land with crops that are not 
genetically modified (GM) to slow down the rate of resistance development (Fisher and 
Laxminarayan, 2005). The effectiveness of such policy creating “crop refuges” has been 
questioned on purely biological grounds, as well as more generally. Specifically, it has been 
argued that private breeders should have an incentive to take into account the problem of the 
evolution of pest resistance, because this process directly affects their profits (Noonan, 2002). 
Thus, private breeders would ensure that existing pest management techniques are used 
efficiently and would invest in the development of new technologies to overcome the resistance 
problem. Fisher and Laxminarayan (2004) note that Monsanto has already modified Bt 
technology, which now makes use of two proteins instead of one, making the development of 
insect resistance more difficult.  
The problem of resistance management was first addressed formally by Hueth and Regev 
(1974), whose study generated considerable interest in the topic (e.g., Carlson and Wetzstein, 
1993). Even though the literature on the excessive use of pesticides and the possibility of market 
failure when dealing with the pest resistance problem has yielded important insights, there is a 
need to move beyond the renewable or nonrenewable resource framework that has been used so 
far and to consider other important features of the economic environment (Alix-Garcia and 
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Zilberman, 2005). In particular, the incentive of private sector breeders to invest in crop 
innovations depends on the delineation of property rights in the various attributes of the new crop 
varieties, and, therefore, the issues of intellectual property rights and the resulting market 
structure should occupy a central place in this debate.  
The interplay between social and private incentives to innovate in the context of the 
resistance problem has received considerable attention recently, and there are several interesting 
conclusions that arise out of this line of research. First, while society as a whole reaps a large 
benefit from technologies that decrease the scope of the resistance problem, the benefits of such 
technologies are dissipated among many users and thus may not attract sufficient private 
investments. This point was made by Goeschl and Swanson (2003b), who also note that the 
nature of the innovation in the context of the biological race against nature is different from the 
situations described in the standard quality ladder model used in many innovation and growth 
models. They coined the term “adaptive destruction” to characterize this process, emphasizing the 
analogy and difference with the Schumpeterian paradigm of “creative destruction” (in which each 
product is eventually superseded by a higher-quality one). Second, as shown by Goeschl and 
Swanson (2003a), private and social incentives to invest in research and development (R&D) 
might diverge with an increase in the degree of adaptive destruction, because the more severe is 
the resistance problem, the lower is the private benefit of crop R&D and the higher are the social 
returns from such investment. In addition to that, Goeschl and Swanson (2002) develop a model 
of an R&D race to compare the solution of the social planner problem in the context of antibiotic 
resistance with the equilibrium outcome of the race. They find that, in general, private incentives 
fall short of generating the first-best outcome.   
In this paper we explore in more detail how the form and extent of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) impact the incentive to innovate and the welfare consequences of innovation, in a 
context characterized by adaptive destruction. Specifically, we compare and contrast the effects 
of two alternative IPR regimes that capture the essential features of the current institutional 
setting. The strong IPR mode, referred to as the full patent (FP) regime, corresponds to the 
standard utility patents (as awarded in the United States by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office). The relatively weaker IPR mode, referred to as the research exemption (RE) regime, 
corresponds to the so-called plant breeders’ rights (PBRs), as implemented in the United States 
by plant variety protection certificates awarded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. As 
discussed below in more detail, the critical difference between these two IPR modes concerns a 
feature that bears on the sequential and cumulative nature of innovation, which is a distinctive 
feature of agricultural and biotechnology innovations.   
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In addition to the consideration of alternative IPR regimes, in our analysis we also 
emphasize the importance of the market structure of the innovation industry, a feature largely 
ignored to date in the analysis of the biological resistance problem. In particular, we build a 
duopoly model of an R&D race in which the value of the final product is destroyed with 
exogenously given probability, thus making the duration of the monopoly power finite even under 
the (simplifying) assumption of an infinite patent life. Conceptually this model belongs to the 
class of symmetric stochastic R&D races in which innovations arrive according to a Poisson 
process (Reinganum, 1989, provides an early survey of this literature). In addition to addressing 
the resistance problem, our analysis contributes to the literature on IPR incentives for sequential 
innovation. Models in this area typically consider the effects of patent length and breadth on the 
division of profit between the owners of the first and second generations of innovation, both in a 
sequential setting (Green and Scotchmer, 1995) and in the context of R&D races (O’Donoghue, 
1998; Denicolò, 2000). In contrast to most of these models, we assume that the second generation 
of the innovation is patentable and non-infringing and we concentrate on the question of whether 
the first innovator has the right to block all further R&D activities related to the patented product 
(i.e., whether or not there exists a research exemption).  
In our setting, under the FP regime, the research on the patented product constitutes an 
infringement. Because of the sequential nature of the innovation process, with this kind of IPR 
protection the winner of the first race obtains an exclusive right to improve the product in the 
future. On the other hand, under the RE regime, firms cannot be excluded from participating in 
any improvement project, so that each improvement stage is a race between two firms. 
Throughout the analysis, we assume that no licensing takes place, in order to emphasize the 
effects of the IPR regimes on the incentives for innovation. In the next section, we provide a brief 
background that illustrates some critical features of our stylized model. We then describe the 
demand side of the model and lay out the structure of the R&D model that embeds, among other 
things, the notion of adaptive destruction. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibria that arise 
and study the incentive and welfare effects of the two IPR regimes of interest.  
 
3.2 IPRs and Crop-Improving R&D in Agriculture 
The need to account explicitly for the nature of IPRs is given more urgency by the 
dramatic changes that have characterized the R&D enterprise in crop improvements and 
biotechnology over the last quarter of a century. Intellectual property protection in these areas has 
been strengthened enormously, leading to what amounts to a revolution in the set of opportunities 
facing innovators (Wright and Pardey, 2006). In the United States, following the 1980 landmark 
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U.S. Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, a major change has been the extension 
of the applicability of standard utility patents to virtually any biologically based invention, if 
obtained through human intervention. That utility patents can be used for the products of plant 
breeding and biotechnology in agriculture was confirmed by the 2001 U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., which held that plant seeds and 
plants themselves (both traditionally bred or produced by genetic engineering) are patentable 
under U.S. law (Janis and Kesan, 2002).  
Whereas the availability of utility patents for plant and animal innovations has also been 
introduced in many other developed countries, in most developing countries PBRs remain the 
strongest IPR protection instrument available. Indeed, in the international context the impetus to 
harmonize and strengthen IPRs in agriculture has resulted from the implementation of the TRIPS 
(trade related aspects of intellectual property rights) agreement of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (Moschini, 2004). A crucial feature of TRIPS is that it mandates that minimum standards 
of IPR protection be provided by each WTO member in each of the main areas of intellectual 
property that it covers. Specifically, patent protection must be accorded for both products and 
processes, for at least 20 years, in almost all fields of technology. But agriculture-related 
innovations enjoy a somewhat special treatment within TRIPS because plant and animal 
innovations need not be protected by patents, as long as a suitable sui generis protection is 
offered. Modern agriculture-related R&D relies heavily on biotechnology innovations, as in the 
development of GM crop varieties, and it turns out that the flexibility provided by TRIPS extends 
further than plant and animal innovation: “essentially biological processes” may also be excluded 
from patentability (although patents must be provided for microorganisms, and for 
microbiological processes for producing plants or animals). 
As noted, if plants and animals are excluded from patentability then under TRIPS a sui 
generis IPR system must be provided. PBRs are commonly used internationally for plant varieties 
and appear to be the sui generis IPR system of choice for many countries, including virtually all 
developing countries. But, unlike utility patents, PBRs allow for a well-defined “research 
exception.” That is, a protected variety may be used by others in their breeding program aimed at 
developing a new variety. Thus, PBRs are clearly a weaker IPR protection instrument than 
patents, and whether the feature that separates these two IPR protection modes has important 
consequences for the innovation enterprise appears to be an important and yet unsettled question.  
Concomitant with the rise of the importance of IPRs for agricultural R&D, the last few 
decades have also witnessed a number of other critical developments. The secular trend in the 
decline of public R&D relative to private R&D (Fuglie et al., 1996) has intensified, and at present 
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the private sector provides the bulk of biological research efforts in agriculture. Furthermore, the 
agricultural seed and chemical industry has undergone a tremendous consolidation. The earlier 
emphasis on the “life sciences” concept was abandoned because of a perceived lack of sufficient 
synergies between plant and human-health biotechnology. What has emerged, instead, is a strong 
consolidation between the seed and the agrochemical industrial segments aimed at exploiting the 
way modern GM varieties can complement and/or substitute for more traditional herbicide and 
pesticide products. A wave of acquisitions has resulted in a highly concentrated and integrated 
agro-chemical sector (UNCTAD, 2006).  
In what follows, we develop a stylized model of innovation that features the biological 
resistance problem and the notion of adaptive destruction, and we do so in a more realistic 
institutional context that is consistent with the critical role played by IPRs and the market 
structure of the relevant industry. In particular, we compare and contrast the effects of two IPR 
regimes that differ precisely with respect to the presence of a research exemption, and, based on 
the foregoing discussion of consolidation in the agro-chemical sector, we cast the analysis in an 
imperfectly competitive setting (specifically, a duopoly).  
 
3.3 A Model of Sequential Innovation 
We imagine a situation in which a biological innovation, such as an improved seed 
variety resistant to a particular pest, can be developed upon a costly and risky R&D process. Once 
developed, this innovation is adopted by a competitive sector, which we represent as made up of 
heterogeneous agents (e.g., farmers), that is, a population of potential costumers with differing 
willingness to pay for the innovation. Consistent with the notion of adaptive destruction discussed 
in the introduction, we also postulate that the value of the innovation is stochastically reduced to 
zero as time goes by. After the value of the existing innovation is thus destroyed, a new R&D 
process can start to re-introduce the resistance trait of interest into the variety. Whether both firms 
can take part in this new innovation effort or only the firm that developed the improved variety in 
the initial innovations state depends on the nature of the IPR system. With an RE regime, both 
firms can participate in follow-on research. But if the IPR system does not allow for a research 
exemption (i.e., the FP regime), then we presume that only the winner of the initial stage can 
engage in efforts to restore the value of the variety after the onset of pest resistance. In either 
case, the winner of each race becomes the monopolist for the duration of the period in which 
innovation has a positive market value. 
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3.3.1 Demand for innovation 
The derived demand ( )D p  for the innovated product protected by IPRs is presumed 
downward sloping, as in Figure 1 where  denotes the choke price. Given the exclusivity 
afforded by IPRs, the innovator can price monopolistically at 
v
Mp  so that, at the quantity 
demanded by users at that price, the marginal production cost mc  equals the marginal revenue 
. Ex post, therefore, the innovator can extract a profit equal to mr π , but some of the innovation’s 
benefits also accrue to users, and relative to the ex post first-best use of the innovation there is 
also a deadweight loss—these two effects are labeled cs  and  in Figure 1 (e.g., Langinier and 
Moschini, 2002). To make the model tractable, we postulate that there is a unit mass of end-users 
whose valuation of the new product is distributed uniformly on the interval [0 . For any given 
price of a new product, only users with valuations above that price will make a purchase. This 
implies that the monopolist faces a linear demand function of the form 
dwl
, ]v
( ) 1 /D p p= − v . If the 
marginal cost of production is constant, as in Figure 1, then without further loss of generality we 
can write . Under these assumptions, the monopolist’s profit per unit of time is given by 0mc =
/ 4vπ = . Given this simplified demand structure, the surplus accruing to consumers under this 
(uniform) monopolistic pricing satisfies / 2cs π= .  
 
3.3.2 Stochastic production of innovation 
At the start of the R&D contest, or after the value of innovation is reduced to zero, the 
firms engage in an R&D race in which the time of discovery is stochastic. As in other strategic 
R&D models (e.g., Reinganum, 1989), we assume that innovations arrive according to a Poisson 
process with arrival rate x . Specifically, each firm that incurs a fixed R&D cost  at the start of 
a race has an instantaneous probability of producing a new product equal to 
c
x  (Denicolò, 1999), 
and the resulting stochastic time of the arrival of the innovation ( )xτ  is distributed exponentially 
so that its cumulative distribution function is given by [ ]Pr ( ) 1 exp( )x z xτ ≤ = − − z . 
The expected profit of a firm, when the total number of competitors is equal to , is 
derived as follows. Denote by 
n
iτ  the random time of arrival of innovation for firm  and let i
min 1min{ ,..., }nτ τ τ= . Then the probability that at least one of firm i’s rivals has made a 
discovery at time  is given by  z
 .       (1) [ ] ( 1)minPr 1 n xzz eτ − −≤ = −
The expected profit of firm  can now be found by integrating the joint density of i min( , )iτ τ  over 
the subset of the support in which miniτ τ≤ . Let W  denote the payoff to the winner of the race. 
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Then, if  denotes the common discount rate of all firms, the expected profit of firm  when n  
firms participate in the R&D contest is given by 
r i
0 ( 1)
0
( 1)rs x n z xsi
s
V e Wx n e xe dzds c
∞ ∞
− − − −= −∫ ∫ −      (2) 
where, again,  is the fixed R&D cost.  Thus, c
0
i
xWV
nx r
= + c− .        (3) 
 
3.3.3 Adaptive destruction 
A critical element of our model is the explicit modeling of the possible devaluation of the 
innovation due to pest adaptation. Such an “adaptive destruction” feature is captured by 
postulating that the value of the new product can be reduced to zero at each point in time with 
instantaneous probability . That is, the stochastic arrival of adaptive destruction time b ADτ  is 
distributed exponentially so that [ ]Pr 1 exp( )AD zτ ≤ = − −bz . Admittedly, this convenient way to 
parameterize adaptive destruction is somewhat special, and there are other reasonable ways to 
model this process. In particular, some may find it desirable to postulate that the stochastic 
process of adaptive destruction leads to a gradual erosion of value. Our assumption that adaptive 
destruction follows a Poisson process with constant instantaneous probability, however, does 
capture the essence of biological adaptation while keeping the model tractable. Our specification 
is also consistent with the parameterization used by Goeschl and Swanson (2003), although they 
do allow the adaptive destruction to be affected by some variables endogenous to the model (e.g., 
adoption). Such an extension is not crucial in our setting because our model does not emphasize 
the diffusion phase of innovation but instead focuses on the R&D strategic interactions brought 
about by different IPR regimes.  
 
3.4. Duopoly Model of Innovation 
As noted in the introduction, we capture the imperfectly competitive industry structure by 
postulating that there are at most two firms in any stage of the game. At the beginning of each 
stage both firms decide whether to take part in the race. The winner of each race obtains IPRs that 
afford exclusivity in the final product market. Upon the onset of adaptive destruction, leading to 
the loss of market value for the innovated product, the race to produce a new product starts again. 
In this setting we interpret the RE regime as allowing both firms to enter the improvement race 
after the value of the innovated crop variety has been reduced to zero by adaptive destruction. 
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Similarly, we interpret the stronger FP regime as restricting access to the improvement stage that 
follows adaptive destruction, so that only the winner of the first race has the right to practice the 
innovation for subsequent improvements. These interpretations are certainly consistent with the 
distinction between PBRs and patents discussed in the introduction, namely, that a patent gives 
full control of the improved variety to the innovator whereas PBRs allow others to use the variety 
for the development of further improvement. In what follows, we characterize the symmetric 
stationary equilibrium of the infinite horizon game under these two IPR regimes. 
 
3.4.1 Research exemption 
Under an RE regime, both firms can enter the race after the value of the crop has been 
reduced to zero. This implies that the game is essentially a sequence of identical races with two 
firms in each contest. The solution concept we employ in this paper is that of a Markov perfect 
equilibrium, i.e., we assume that strategies of the firms can depend only on the current state of the 
game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Let ( , ) [0,1] [0,1]i jσ σ ∈ ×  denote a stationary strategy profile 
of this game and let 0 ( , )i jV σ σ  denote the expected payoff of firm i  at the beginning of the race 
(i.e., when no firm has yet produced an innovation). Upon arrival of the innovation, the successful 
firm (which we label the “leader”) can market the innovation. But because of the adaptive 
destruction feature discussed earlier, the value of this innovation is eventually destroyed. When 
that happens, a new innovation race can start, and under the RE regime both firms can participate. 
This means that the firm that is not successful in the firm innovation (which we label the 
“follower”) still obtains value from the opportunity to take part in future innovation rounds. Thus, 
let ( , )L i jV σ σ  and ( , )F i jV σ σ  denote the expected payoffs of firm  when it is the leader and 
when it is the follower, respectively. Then these functions are determined by the following 
conditions: 
i
0
( , ) ( , )
( , )
2
( , ) ( , )
(1 ) (1 )
L i j F i j
i j i j
F i j L i j
i j j i
xV xV
V c
x r
xV xV
c
x r x r
σ σ σ σσ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σσ σ σ σ
+⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ − + − −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
  (4) 
( )0( , ) ( , ) ( , )L i j i j L i jrV b V Vσ σ π σ σ σ σ= + −      (5) 
( )0( , ) ( , ) ( , )F i j i j F i jrV b V Vσ σ σ σ σ σ= − .     (6) 
Equation (4) is the expected profit of firm  for a given strategy profile (i , )i jσ σ . 
Equation (5) is a standard Bellman equation, which says that the instantaneous return to being the 
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innovation leader in this duopoly equals the flow of profit π  from marketing the innovation 
while it obtains plus the expected loss of value caused by the possibility of adaptive destruction. 
The Bellman equation (6) exhibits the property that there is value to being in this duopoly 
industry, even without any marketable product, because the possibility of adaptive destruction 
entails (in the RE regime) the possibility of taking part in future (and potentially profitable) R&D 
contests. The following proposition characterizes the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the 
game under the RE regime. 
 
Proposition 1. The symmetric MPE under the RE regime is given by the strategy 
profile ( ),RE REσ σ  that satisfies the following conditions:   
(i)  1REσ = , if 1REc tπ ≤  
(ii)  (0,1)REσ ∈ , if 1 0RE ct tπ< <  
(iii)  0REσ = , if 0c tπ ≥  
where  
1 ( )(2
RE xt
r b x r
≡ + + )        (7) 
0 ( )(
xt
r b x r
≡ + + ) .      (8) 
 
A detailed proof of this result is provided in the Appendix, which also reports an explicit 
expression for the REσ  that applies to the case (ii). 
The fact that the two firms are ex ante identical justifies interest in the symmetric MPE. 
In such a context, a pure strategy equilibrium in which both firms invest with probability one 
emerges when the R&D cost c  is sufficiently low (relative to the per-period payoff π ), that is, 
when 1
REc tπ ≤ . Similarly, when R&D cost is too high, that is, when 0c tπ ≥ , both firms abstain 
from investing. Finally, for intermediate values of the R&D cost, that is, when 1 0
REt c π< < t , 
either firm would be willing to invest conditional on the other firm abstaining. In addition to such 
asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, there is a symmetric mixed strategy MPE in which each firm 
invests with probability (0,1)REσ ∈ , as per Proposition 1. The particular value of this 
probability, as well as the value of the threshold levels  and , of course depends on the 1
REt 0t
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primitive parameters of the model (i.e., the Poisson arrival rates x  and b , and the discount rate 
). r
 
3.4.2 Full patent  
Under the FP regime, the winner of the first race is the only one who has the right to 
practice the innovation for subsequent improvements. Let  denote the value to the monopolist 
who has the property rights for the (existing) improved variety that is sold in the market, and let 
mV
0
FPV  denote the expected profit of the firm that has the exclusive right (because of the FP regime) 
to engage in the R&D process in order to produce the next generation of a product. Recalling 
equation (3), these value functions must satisfy  
 0
FP mxVV c
x r
= −+         (9) 
as well as the asset equation 
 ( )0FPmrV b V Vπ= + − m .       (10) 
Solving for the value functions we obtain  
 ( )( )
( )( )m
bc x rV
r b x r bx
π − += + + − ,       (11) 
 0
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
FP bc x c r b x r bxV
r b x r bx
π − − + + −= + + − .      (12) 
Recall that under the FP regime there is only one race at the start of the game, the winner of 
which will exclude the other firm from trying to improve the product in the future. In order to 
solve for the equilibrium we need to find the optimal strategies of the two firms in the initial race. 
The equilibrium under the FP regime is described in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. The symmetric MPE under FP regime is given by the strategy 
profile ( ),FP FPσ σ  that satisfies the following conditions:  
(i) 1FPσ = , if 1FPc tπ ≤  
(ii) (0,1)FPσ ∈ , if 1 0FP ct tπ< <  
(iii) 0FPσ = , if 0c tπ ≥  
where  is still defined as in equation (8), and  0t
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1
( )
(2 )( ) ( )
FP x x rt
x r x r b r bx x r
+≡ + + + + + .    (13) 
 
A detailed proof of this result is provided in the Appendix, which also reports an explicit 
expression for the FPσ  that applies to the case (ii). 
As for the case of the RE regime, we find that the symmetric MPE can involve pure 
strategies with both firms investing when the R&D cost is low enough (relative to the per-period 
payoff π ), or with both firms not investing when the R&D cost is too high. For a specific domain 
of the cost-to-profit ratio, specifically 1
FPt c π 0t< < , the two firms follow an equilibrium mixed 
strategy. It is informative to observe the relationship between threshold levels under the two 
regimes. First, note that the parameter  is common to both regimes. Next, from the expressions 
given in (7) and (13) it can be verified that 
0t
1 1
FP Rt t> E
] ]
. This result is intuitive because it implies 
that the level of the cost-to-profit ratio at which both firms start to invest with probability one is 
higher when the winner becomes a monopolist in the improvement game. A comparison of the 
two IPR regimes’ equilibria is given in Figure 2.  
 
3.5 Comparing IPR Alternatives: Ex Ante Profits 
Having characterized the various equilibria that can emerge in our R&D model, we can now 
compare the economic implications of the two IPR regimes of interest. Consider first the ex ante 
expected payoff to the two firms. When firms follow a non-degenerate mixed strategy, they must 
be indifferent between the actions upon which they are randomizing. Given that not investing 
entails a zero expected payoff, it follows that the expected payoff of a mixed strategy that assigns 
nonzero probability to not investing is itself zero. Hence, we know that (a) in the interval 
, profits are zero under both IPR regimes; (b) in the interval , profits are zero 
under the RE regime, and positive under the FP regime; and (c) in the interval , profits are 
positive under both IPR regimes. 
1 0[ ,
FPt t 1 1[ ,
RE FPt t
1[0, ]
REt
In the interval 1[0, ]
FPt , both firms invest with probability one under the FP regime. 
Recalling equation (3), the ex ante expected profit of each firm in this case is given by 
0 2
FP mV x c
x r
Π = −+         (14) 
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where  is the value of being the monopolist of the innovation (and of the right to pursue 
further innovations, upon the onset of pest resistance), as defined earlier. By using equation (11) 
we find that the ex ante expected profit can be written as 
mV
0
FP
FP Fc Pπα βΠ = − , where 
 ( )
(2 )( )FP
x x r
x r r b x r
α +≡ + + +        (15) 
and 1FP Fb Pβ α≡ + . 
Similarly, in the interval , both firms invest with probability one under the RE 
regime. By using the expression of the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix, when 
1[0, ]
REt
1i jσ σ= = , 
the ex ante expected profit of each firm can be written as 0
RE
RE REcπα βΠ = − , where  
(2 )RE
x
x r b r
α ≡ + +         (16) 
(2 )( )
(2 )RE
x r r b
x r b r
β + +≡ + + .        (17) 
From the foregoing equations it follows that RE FPα α> , and also that RE FPβ β> .  It follows 
that, for a given π , for low values of the cost parameter  the ex ante expected profit is higher 
under the RE regimes, whereas for higher values of the cost parameter the FP regime yields 
higher ex ante expected profit.  More specifically, the ranking of ex ante expected profit under the 
two IPR regimes can be summarized as in the following proposition. 
c
 
Proposition 3. The firm’s expected profit under the RE regime is higher than the 
expected profit under the FP regime if and only if RE FP
RE FP
c tα απ β β
−≤ ≡−  . 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the expected profit functions under the two IPR regimes for a given 
level of the per-period profit (i.e., varying only the cost parameter while keeping the profit 
parameter fixed). In this graph, the threshold t , as defined in Proposition 3, is the point at which 
. As established in Proposition 3, Figure 3 shows that firms will ex ante prefer the RE 
regime—the weaker of the two IPR regimes—if is low enough, that is, as long as 

0
RE FPΠ = Π0
c c tπ ≤  .  
The intuition for this result can be obtained by considering the objective functions of each 
firm under the two IPR regimes when both firms invest with probability one in equilibrium, 
which happens in the interval . From equation (4) we know that when both firms invest with 
probability one the ex ante expected profit can be written as 
[0, ]t
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( )
0
2 0.5 (1,1) 0.5 (1,1)
2
L FRE x V V c
x r
+Π = −+       (18) 
where  and  are defined in equations (5) and (6). Note that this can be interpreted 
as if each firm could pay amount  to get a lottery with equal chances of becoming the leader 
and the follower, with corresponding expected payoff discounted by the factor 
(1,1)LV (1,1)FV
c
2
2
x
x r+ . On the 
other hand, from equation (14) we can write  
( )
0
2 0.5
2
mFP x V c
x r
Π = −+ .        (19) 
Similarly to the RE regime, this can be interpreted as each firm obtaining a lottery with equal 
probabilities of becoming a monopolist and dropping out of the race.  
By comparing equations (18) and (19), it is now clear that the firm’s ex ante profits are 
higher under the RE regime if and only if 
(1,1) (1,1)L FV V+ ≥ mV .        (20) 
In other words, this would be the case when the expected payoff of the industry with two firms 
both investing with probability one is higher than the expected payoff of the industry with only 
one firm investing with probability one. Note that industry with two firms will have both higher 
R&D costs and a higher arrival rate of innovation, resulting in larger total profit when the R&D 
cost is close to zero, as was previously shown.  
This finding that firms may, ex ante, prefer the RE regimes is similar to the result of 
Bessen and Maskin (2002), who show that sometimes firms might prefer a weaker IP regime 
before the start of a race. This result in Bessen and Maskin arises because of the authors’ 
assumption that innovations are complementary (diversity of innovation increases the probability 
of discovery, which is essential to keep the innovation process going). In our model, the downside 
of the FP regime from a firm’s ex ante perspective is that losing the first innovation stage 
forecloses the possibility of profitable innovations in the future. This lost opportunity is 
particularly valuable when the R&D cost is relatively low.  
 
3.6 Comparing IPR Alternatives: Welfare 
In addition to the profit flowing to the firms, for the welfare comparison of the two IPR regimes 
we need to account for the surplus that flows to consumers whenever an innovation is 
commercialized (recall Figure 1).  
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3.6.1 Expected consumer surplus 
Considering the RE regime first, let  denote the ex ante expected surplus to 
consumers when the IPR system allows for a research exemption. Also, let  denote the 
expected consumer surplus, under this regime, whenever a successful innovation is achieved. 
Then  and  must satisfy the following asset equations: 
0
RES
1
RES
0
RES 1
RES
 ( ) ( )2 10 2 2 12
RE RE
RE
RE RE RE
1xSS xS
x r x
σ σ σ= + −+ + r      (21) 
 1 0(2
RE RE RErS b S S1 )
π= + − .       (22) 
As can be seen from the equation (21), the expected ex ante surplus depends on the number of 
firms investing in R&D. With probability (  both firms invest in R&D, and with probability 
 there is a single firm in the race. In the latter case the expected time until the 
arrival of innovation is longer, with instantaneous probability of discovery equal to 
)2REσ
(2 1RE REσ σ− )
x  (as 
opposed to 2x  when both firms invest). Equation (22) is a standard Bellman equation and 
represents the flow of consumer surplus from the existing innovation. According to this equation, 
the instantaneous expected return to consumers to having an innovation (i.e., ) is equal to 
the flow of consumer surplus while the innovation lasts (i.e., 
1
RErS
2π ) plus the expected loss of this 
surplus due to the possibility of adaptive destruction (i.e., ). 0 1( )
RE REb S S−
Solving equations (21) and (22) yields 
 
2
0 2
(2 ) ( )
( )(2 )( ) 2 (2 ) ( )
RE RERE
RE RE
x x r x
S
r b x r x r bx x r x
π σ σ
σ σ
⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤+ + + − + −⎣ ⎦
,   (23) 
To derive the consumer surplus under the FP alternative, consider the moment at which a 
firm has won the initial R&D contest such that this firm can now market the innovation at a profit 
flow of π  (as long as resistance does not arise). Upon the onset of resistance, the FP regime 
gives the firm the sole right to research for an improvement that overcomes the resistance. In such 
a setting, let 1
FPS  denote the expected consumer surplus when there is an innovation at hand, and 
let  denote the expected consumer surplus when no innovation is available and only one firm 
(a monopoly) has the right to invest in R&D. Then 
mS
1
FPS  and  must satisfy the following asset 
equations: 
mS
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 1
FP
m
xSS
x r
= +          (24) 
 1 (2 1
)FP mrS b S S
FPπ= + − .       (25) 
Solving these two equations yields  
 1 2 ( )
FP x rS
x r b r
π +⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ + +⎝ ⎠ .       (26) 
Now let 0
FPS  denote the ex ante expected consumer surplus under the FP regime. Given the 
equilibrium strategy profile, this expected consumer surplus would be equal to 
 ( ) ( )2 10 2 2 12 1
FP F
FP
FP FP FP
PxSS xS
x r x
σ σ σ= + −+ + r .     (27) 
Using the solution in equation (26), it follows that 
 
2
0
(2 ) ( )
( ) (2 )
FP FP FPx rxS
x r b r x r
σ σπ ⎛ ⎞+ −= ⎜⎜+ + +⎝ ⎠
x ⎟⎟ .     (28) 
 
 
3.6.2 Welfare comparison: Analytic results 
By using the foregoing derivation for  and 0
RES 0
FPS , we can unambiguously rank social 
welfare when the cost of R&D, relative to the potential payoff of the innovation, in not too high.   
 
Proposition 4. The RE regime results in a higher level of social welfare if [0, ]c tπ ∈  .  
 
To see why this result must hold, evaluate equations (23) and (28) at 1FP REσ σ= = . It can then 
be verified that when both firms invest with probability one, the consumer surplus functions 
satisfy , and so we conclude that in the domain of interest, the RE regime results 
in a higher level of social welfare. This result is very intuitive. Because both firms invest with 
probability one under either regime in the domain 
0 0(1) (1)
RE FPS S>
1[0, ]
REc tπ ∈ , the RE regime results in a 
higher rate of innovation for all improvement stages (after the onset of resistance), and so in this 
domain consumers are necessarily better off under the RE regime. Furthermore, as long as 
[0, ]c tπ ∈  , we have shown that firms also ex ante prefer the RE regime. Because , we 
can then conclude that in the domain of interest social welfare is higher with the RE regime.  
1
REt t<
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3.6.3 Welfare comparison: Numerical results 
Proposition 4 does not rank the two IPR regimes when R&D cost is sufficiently high, that is, 
when 0[ , ]c t tπ ∈  . To compare social welfare in this domain, we need to take into account the 
types of equilibria that can occur. In particular, we have to distinguish three cases:   
(A) 1 0[ ,
FPc t t ]π ∈ . In this interval, firms’ profits are equal to zero under both regimes, so the social 
welfare under both regimes is equal to the corresponding consumer surplus. 
(B) 1 1[ ,
RE FPc t t ]π ∈ . In this interval, firms make positive profit under the FP regime, and social 
welfare under the FP regime is equal to the sum of profits and consumer surplus. 
(C) 1[ , ]
FPc t tπ ∈  . In this interval, firms make positive profit under both regimes, and both welfare 
functions are equal to the sum of profit and consumer surplus. 
Because the equilibrium strategies FPσ  and REσ  are in general functions of π  and c  
parameters (see the Appendix), it does not appear possible to provide an analytic result that would 
establish unambiguously the welfare ranking of the two IPR regimes. To gain some insights, here 
we resort to comparing welfare numerically. In particular, we normalize profit to be equal to one 
( 1)π =  and study social welfare as a function of  for a given set of parameter values. We 
calibrate the model so that the resulting durations of an innovation race and the useful life of a 
new variety are broadly consistent with what is observed in the plant breeding industry. In 
particular, we perform our numerical analysis for the following parameters values. The discount 
factor is fixed at . The arrival rate of innovation 
c
0.05r = x  is equal to either 0.25 or 0.125, which 
corresponds to the expected times until discovery of 4 or 8 years, respectively. The destruction 
rate b  is equal to 0.2, 0.1, or 0.05, which corresponds to the expected lifetime of a new variety of 
5, 10, or 20 years, respectively. The resulting threshold values (which determine the domains of 
equilibria A, B, and C for which numerical analysis is performed) are given in Table 1. 
For each pair ( , )x b  we computed the social welfare functions under RE and under the FP 
regimes on the interval  (we already know the welfare ranking for the range  
from Proposition 4). These computed welfare levels are graphed in Figure 4, where welfare is 
measured on the vertical axes and R&D cost on the horizontal axes (welfare under the RE 
regimes is represented by the dashed line and welfare under the FP regime is represented by the 
solid line).  
0[ , ]c t t∈  [0, ]c t∈ 
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Consistent with what was established in Proposition 4, at c t=   social welfare is higher 
under the RE regime. But as  increases, the numerical analysis shows that at some point the FP 
regime dominates. Hence, this suggests the general conclusion that for the parameter values, 
which reflect the nature of the plant breeding industry, the FP regime is socially optimal when the 
cost of innovation is relatively high. In this case the stronger incentives provided by the FP 
regime lead to a higher flow of innovations and higher social welfare. On the other hand, when 
the cost of R&D is relatively low, a weaker intellectual property regime such as RE is beneficial 
from the social point of view. Additional numerical analysis, not reported here, shows that this 
general conclusion appears robust to changes in the underlying parameter values well outside the 
range explored in Figure 4.  
c
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The analysis of this paper contributes to the discussion of economic policies that may 
mitigate problems caused by pest resistance. In contrast to much of the previous literature, which 
deals with this issue within the renewable or non-renewable resource framework, this study has 
focused on the role of an institutional factor that is having an increasing influence on the R&D 
process in plant breeding, namely, the nature of intellectual property rights. In particular, we 
construct an explicit model of the two types of intellectual property regimes that are widely used 
to protect plant innovations and study the effect of the resulting market structure on the incentive 
to invest in plant breeding R&D and social welfare. The two types of intellectual property 
protection in question are those provided by utility patents and those provided by Plant Variety 
Protection certificates. The latter intellectual property regime results in a weaker form of 
protection because it allows for a well-defined research exemption provision. We specifically 
focus on the adaptive destruction process, which arises because of the reduction of the market 
value of the crops due to pest adaptation.  
The model that we have analyzed is necessarily very stylized, yet it yields some 
interesting analytic and numerical results. Specifically, we find that the welfare ranking of the 
intellectual property regimes depends on the cost-to-profit ratio. In our model, the R&D activity 
requires a fixed outlay at the start of the innovation race, which can be interpreted as the cost of 
starting and maintaining a new plant breeding program. The analytic results established in this 
paper imply that when the cost is relatively low, the research exemption regime yields a higher 
welfare. Our numerical results suggest that for a high cost-to-profit ratio it is the full patent 
regime that provides better incentives to invest in R&D and yields higher social welfare. These 
results are established by calibrating the model so that the expected durations of innovation and 
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adaptive destruction processes are broadly representative of the plant breeding industry. An 
additional result established in this paper implies that when the value of the cost-to-profit ratio is 
low, firms ex ante prefer the research exemption regime, even though it is a weaker form of 
protection (this conclusion is similar to that obtained by Bessen and Maskin [2002] in a different 
model of sequential innovation). 
In addition to deriving the profit and welfare effects of alternative intellectual property 
regimes used in the plant breeding, the analysis of this paper also emphasizes that the form of 
intellectual property rights defines the market structure of the industry, and that this market 
structure will not necessarily coincide with the two extreme cases of monopoly and perfect 
competition that have been the focus of the majority of previous studies. Future work toward the 
derivation of cogent implications for policymakers concerned with the adaptive destruction 
problem, therefore, may need to account more explicitly for the (sometimes subtle) effects of 
alternative institutions that establish and strengthen intellectual property rights. 
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3.9 Tables 
Table 1. Threshold values 
0.125, 0.1x b= =  1.32t =  1 2.78REt =  1 3.47FPt =  0 4.76t =  
0.25, 0.1x b= =  1.02t =  1 3.03REt =  1 4.05FPt =  0 5.56t =  
0.125, 0.05x b= =  1.69t =  1 4.17REt =  1 4.89FPt =  0 7.14t =  
0.25, 0.05x b= =  1.22t =  1 4.55REt =  1 5.61FPt =  0 8.33t =  
0.125, 0.2x b= =  0.91t =  1 1.67REt =  1 2.19FPt =  0 2.86t =  
0.25, 0.2x b= =  0.77t =  1 1.82REt =  1 2.61FPt =  0 3.33t =  
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3.10 Figures 
Figure 1. Demand for innovation 
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Figure 2. Equilibria under the two IPR alternatives 
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Figure 3. Comparison of ex ante profits 
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Figure 4. Welfare under FP (solid line) and RE (dashed line) regimes 
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3.11 Appendix 
3.11.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (RE regime) 
Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) we obtain 
0 0
0
0
( , ) ( , )2( , ) (1 )
(2 ) ( ) (2 ) ( )
( , )
(1 ) ( (1 ) )
i j i j
i j i j i j
i j
j i i j j i
bV bVx x xV
x r r b x r r b x r r b
bVx c
x r r b
σ σ σπσ σ σ σ σ σ
π σ σσ σ σ σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ + + + + +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
+⎛ ⎞+ − − + −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
σ
 
Rearranging: 
0
1( , ) (1 )
( , ) (2 ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j i j j i ii j
x xV c
x r r b x r r b
π πσ σ σ σ σ σσ σ
⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥Φ + + + +⎣ ⎦σ− , 
where 
( )(1 ) (1 )2
( , ) 1
(2 )( ) ( )( )
i j j ii j
i j
xbxb
x r r b x r r b
σ σ σσ σσ σ − + −Φ ≡ − −+ + + +
σ
. 
Part (i). First note that if 1jσ = , then  
0 ( , ) ( ,1) (2 ) ( )
i
i j
i
xV c
x r r b
σ πσ σ σ
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥Φ + +⎣ ⎦
. 
Note also that the first term 
1
1 1
( ,1) ( )( ) 2
i i
i
i
rxb
x r r b x r
σ σσσ
−⎛ ⎞⎛= − +⎜ ⎟⎜Φ + + ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟+ , is increasing in iσ . 
This implies that if 1
(2 ) ( )
x c
x r r b π>+ +  then 1iσ =  is the best response and both firms invest 
with probability 1 in equilibrium. 
Part (ii). For notational simplicity let *REσ σ≡ . In the interior equilibrium, firm i  is indifferent 
between investing and not for any given jσ . Then the equilibrium symmetric strategy 
*i jσ σ σ= =  must satisfy 0 0(1, *) (0, *)V Vσ σ= , that is, 
 1 * (1 *)
(1, *) (2 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
x x c
x r r b x r r b
π πσ σσ
⎡ ⎤ 0+ − −⎢ ⎥Φ + + + +⎣ ⎦ =
  
from which we can solve 
(2 ) ( )( )* 1x r c r b x r
x x
σ π
+ +⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+
1
. 
Next, the condition 0 *σ< <  implies that this solution applies if and only if  
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( )(2 ) ( )(
x c x
r b x r r b x rπ< <+ + + + ) . 
Part (iii). Note that if 0jσ =  then  
0 ( , ) ( ,0) ( ) ( )
i
i j
i
xV c
x r r b
σ πσ σ σ
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥Φ + +⎣ ⎦
. 
Clearly, if 1
( ) ( )
x c
x r r b π<+ + , then 0iσ =  is a best response and none of the firms invests in 
equilibrium.  
 
3.11.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (FP regime) 
Consider the initial stage of the game. For a given strategy profile ( ) 2, [0,1i jσ σ ∈ ]  the payoff of 
firm i in the initial stage is given by 
0 ( , ) (1 )2
m m
i j i j i j
V x V xV c
x r x r
σ σ σ σ σ σ⎛ ⎞ ⎛= − + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ c
⎞− ⎟⎠ , 
or, rearranging, 
0 ( , ) 1 2
jm
i j i
xV x
V c
x r x r
σσ σ σ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
− . 
Part (i). Note that if 1jσ =  we have 
0 ( , ) 2
m
i j i
V xV c
x r
σ σ σ ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ . 
This implies that if 
2
mV x c
x r
≥+  then 1iσ =  is the best response and both firms invest with 
probability 1 in equilibrium. Substituting for  yields mV
 ( )
(2 )( ) ( )
c x x r
x r x r b r bx x rπ
+≤ + + + + + . 
Part (ii). For notational simplicity let *FPσ σ≡ . In the interior equilibrium, firm i  is indifferent 
between investing and not for any given jσ . Then the equilibrium symmetric strategy profile 
*i jσ σ σ= =  must satisfy 0 0(1, *) (0, *)V Vσ σ= , from which we obtain 
( ) 2* m
m
V x c x r x r
V x x
σ − + +⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
Again, the condition 0 * 1σ< <  implies that this solution applies if and only if  
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 ( )
(2 )( ) ( ) ( )( )
x x r c x
x r x r b r bx x r r b x rπ
+ < <+ + + + + + + . 
Part (iii). Note that if 0jσ = , then 
 0 ( , )
m
i j i
V xV c
x r
σ σ σ ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ . 
This implies that if m
V x c
x r
≤+  then 0iσ =  is the best response and none of the firms invests in 
equilibrium. This condition can be further simplified, by using the expression for , to obtain mV
 
( )(
c x
)x r r bπ ≥ + + .  
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CHAPTER 4. UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY AND THE URBAN WAGE 
PREMIUM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It has been long established that workers in large metropolitan areas earn higher wages 
than observationally equivalent workers living elsewhere. In a recent study Glaeser and Mare 
(2001) report that workers residing in metropolitan areas receive an average wage premium 
ranging from 19% to 33% over workers living in non-metro areas, and point out that the 
magnitude of the premium is larger than, for example, the racial wage gap. Whereas the existence 
of a urban wage premium is well documented, understanding the forces behind this phenomenon 
is still an open question. It is clear that any possible explanation of the urban wage premium must 
address two obvious questions. First, why do workers in non-metro areas not take advantage of 
the urban wage premium by migrating to larger cities? Second, why do firms stay in cities if the 
price of labor is much lower in non-metro areas? 
In most empirical studies, the first question is often dealt with by arguing that after 
accounting for cost of living and site-specific amenities, real wages are the same in urban and 
non-urban regions. This argument, first proposed  by Roback (1982), undoubtedly explains at 
least some part of the wage premium. While theoretically appealing, this hypothesis has little 
empirical content because it is difficult to refute it in practice. Indeed, if the wage premium 
remains after accounting for various area specific characteristics, one can always claim that some 
unobserved factors were omitted from the consideration (Glaeser and Mare (2001)). On the other 
hand, alternative explanations of differences between labor quality across different geographical 
labor markets (Johnson(1953)) have received little systematic attention in the literature. As we 
will argue below, if workers' unobserved ability is not independent of the place of residence, then 
empirical studies that ignore this possibility might produce misleading results. 
The second question (why do firms stay in cities) has been subjected to an extensive 
theoretical analysis. In particular, various forms of agglomeration economies, such as lower 
transportation cost, faster learning and knowledge spillovers all offer a rationale for the higher 
marginal product of labor in densely populated areas. These theories usually deliver precise 
testable implications. For example, if lower input cost and knowledge spillovers make firms more 
productive in densely populated areas (Ciccone and Hall (1996)), then workers moving from non-
urban to urban areas must experience discontinuous wage increases. On the other hand, if higher 
urban density facilitates more productive interactions between people (Glaeser (1999)) or results 
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in low search frictions, then the wages of workers who move into urban areas must increase 
gradually over time. 
These theories enjoy some degree of empirical support. For example, both Glaeser and 
Mare (2001) and Yankow (2006) find that movers into large cities tend to experience faster wage 
growth. Similarly, Wheeler (2006) finds evidence of faster wage growth in urban areas using the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data set. He argues that this effect is mostly due 
to the large number of job-to-job transitions, as opposed to the faster wage growth on the same 
job. This evidence supports the theory that the average quality of a match is higher and search 
frictions are lower in the urban areas. 
It must be noted that the way these studies address potential difference in unobserved 
ability levels across urban and non-urban areas raises concerns about the validity of such 
empirical findings. In particular, these studies tend to concentrate on measuring various forms of 
agglomeration effects while leaving the location decisions of individual workers in the 
background. In this paper we will argue that subjecting the location decisions of workers to 
careful analysis might improve our understanding the urban wage premium. In particular, it is 
widely agreed that the labor migration process is best viewed as endogenous and related to 
individual workers' characteristics. This naturally leads to the possibility that the urban wage 
premium might result, at least in part, from differences in workers' quality across the two regions. 
For example, Fucsh (1967) argues that ``... one of the most promising hypotheses to explain the 
city-size differential is that it reflects differences in labor quality not captured by standardization 
for color, age, sex, and education. This might take the form of better quality schooling, more on-
the-job training, selective in-migration to the big cities of more ambitious and hard working 
persons, or other forms.'' 
This difference in unobserved ability of the workforce, however,  is difficult to control 
for in a simple regression setting because of the possible correlation between unobserved ability 
and location preferences. Such correlation is quite likely for several reasons. First, various 
consumption externalities that are present in big cities tend to cater to the richer and more 
educated segment of the population. Second, higher competition in the dense labor markets of 
large metropolitan areas naturally attracts the more ambitious and able workers. Careful empirical 
analysis of the urban wage premium, therefore, must take into account the potential location 
endogeneity problem. Such an endogeneity makes it difficult to distinguish empirically between 
the agglomeration externalities present in dense labor markets and the composition effects arising 
because of the non-random selection of workers into cities of different sizes. 
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Whereas the possibility of an endogeneity bias is widely acknowledged in the urban wage 
premium literature, it is rarely dealt with systematically. It is usually either ignored or, if panel 
data are used, wage regressions with fixed effects are estimated. However, if residential switching 
is endogenous then both of these estimation methods produce biased and inconsistent estimates. 
In addition, if workers' skills are priced differently at the margin in urban and non-urban areas, 
fixed effects will be biased even in the absence of self-selection: for example if skills have higher 
value in cities, the estimated wage premium will overstate the expected wage increase from 
moving to the urban area (Yankow (2006)). The direction of the bias is uncertain in general, 
which makes the interpretation of the obtained estimates of the wage premium difficult. 
The goal of this paper is to provide selectivity corrected estimates of the urban wage 
premium by taking into account the potential endogeneity of workers' location decision. We start 
by estimating a simple two-equation endogenous treatment model using data from the first wave 
of the National Survey of Families and Households, which provides data from a nationally 
representative sample of working age individuals and their families. Using the number of children 
under the age of eighteen as an instrument for residential choice, we show that although the 
estimate of the urban wage premium is equal to 17% if estimated by OLS regression, after 
controlling for possible endogenous selection it becomes negative (but not significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level). We also find that the hypothesis of no correlation between errors in 
the wage and selection equations is rejected. 
Next, we generalize our results by estimating a two-sector version of the Roy (1951) 
model which allows for a more general pattern of correlation of the sector-specific errors in the 
wage equations. We find substantial evidence of non-random selection into urban and non-urban 
areas. More importantly, we show that estimates of the urban wage premium are highly sensitive 
to the random selection assumption. In addition, we find that the returns to observable 
characteristics differ markedly between urban and non-urban sectors. In general, these results 
suggest the presence of an endogeneity bias in OLS estimates and indicate that selection on 
unobservables can potentially explain a substantial part of the observed urban wage premium. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents some preliminary evidence 
that suggests that ability levels might differ across urban and non-urban areas. Section 3 outlines 
two econometric models that could be used to estimate the magnitude of the urban wage premium 
while controlling for endogenous selection. Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis. 
Section 5 discusses empirical findings and section 6 concludes. 
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4.2 Preliminary Evidence 
To obtain a preliminary view of the extent of potential ability bias we follow the formal 
argument outlined by Glaeser and Mare (2001) in their study of the urban wage premium. In 
particular, let jφ  denote the efficiency units of labor of individual . In this context j jφ  
represents a measure of ability of person , broadly defined to include both observed and 
unobserved ability. Let  denote the price per efficiency unit of labor in location i  and  be 
the consumer price level at this location. Then, as shown by Glaeser and Mare (2001) the 
following equality must hold in equilibrium 
j
iw iP
  ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ln( / )i k i k i kW W P Pφ φ− = − +
where ˆsW  and sˆφ  denote the logarithm of the geometric mean of wages and ability levels in city 
, respectively. This equation implies that if the real wages are different between metro and non-
metro areas, then  it must be the case that ability levels are different between these areas. 
s
We use data from the Regional Economic Information System database to conduct a 
rough test of the hypothesis that cities are equal in the average levels of workers' unobserved 
ability. The cost of living index developed by DuMond, Hirsch and MacPherson (1999) is used to 
compare real wages in 1990 in a cross section of major U.S. urban areas and in order to partially 
adjust for the impact of the city-specific amenities we use data on climatic conditions from 
Burchfield et al (2006). The results presented in Table 1 indicate that after including cooling and 
heating degree days, the coefficient on city size increases in magnitude and remains statistically 
significant. While other city-specific factors affect real wages in that location, it is not possible to 
predict the direction of the omitted variable bias in the estimates presented above. In particular, 
while such city characteristics as cultural diversity and product variety are positively correlated 
with city size, others (such as traffic congestion) are negatively correlated. Furthermore, it must 
be noted that while city-specific characteristics can potentially explain the difference in real 
wages, this theory is testable only to the extent that all possible amenities can be measured and 
included in the model. At the same time, these differences are not incompatible with the situation 
in which the quality of the labor pool differs systematically from one geographical area to the 
other. 
This evidence suggests that the hypothesis that self-selected migration can explain a 
substantial part of the urban wage premium deserves a closer examination. We proceed by 
proposing two models which take the endogenous migration decisions into account and estimate 
them by using the NSFH data. 
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4.3 Econometric Specification 
The simplest approach to estimating urban wage premium employed in the literature is to 
estimate the following equation  
 0 1i i iW x T iβ β α ε′= + + +        (1) 
where  is the log of the hourly wage of individual i , iW ix  is the set of observable characteristics 
and  is a binary variable which is equal to one if a person resides in an urban area and is equal 
to zero otherwise. If the urban dummy  and all other variables are uncorrelated with the error 
term, then OLS estimator of 
iT
iT
α  provides a consistent estimate of the premium in hourly wage 
received by a person who lives in an urban area compared with an observationally equivalent 
worker in the non-urban environment. 
There are good reasons, however, to believe that the location decision should be properly 
viewed as endogenous and possibly correlated with some unobserved (or incompletely observed)  
worker characteristics, such as ability. In particular, let  denote the set of characteristics which 
influence the location decision (note that  may overlap with 
iz
iz ix ). Then one way to model the 
location decision of person i  is to assume that  is determined by the following condition  iT
(i i iT I z u 0)γ′= + >         (2) 
where  is a random error term and iu ( )I S  is an indicator function which is equal to one if the 
statement  is true and equal to zero otherwise. Then the urban dummy  is endogenous if the 
error terms 
S iT
iε  and  are correlated. In what follows, we will assume that they have a bivariate 
normal distribution. In particular, let 
iu
εσ  denote the variance of iε  and uεσ  denote the 
covariance between the two error terms. The variance of the error term in the selection equation is 
normalized to one. In this model the conditional expectations of the wage equation are given by 
 0 1( | , , 1) ( | )i i i i i i i iE W x z T x E u zβ α β ε γ′ ′= = + + + < −     (3) 
 0 1( | , , 1) ( |i i i i i i i iE W x z T x E u z )β β ε γ′ ′= = + + > −     (4) 
Because the error term is truncated, OLS estimation of the equation (1) produces inconsistent 
estimates. This problem can be avoided by using the two-stage procedure proposed in Heckman 
(1978) and Heckman (1979). In particular, the conditional expectations on the right hand side can 
be approximated by the selection term u iεσ λ , where iλ  is defined as 
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( ) ( )( ) ( | , ) (1 )
( ) 1 (
i
i i i i i i i
i i
z zz E z T T T
z z )
iφ γ φ γλ γ ε γ γ
′ ′− −′ = = − +′ ′Φ − −Φ −     
Thus, iλ   is the selectivity correction term obtained from the probit selection equation, where 
 and ( )Φ ⋅ ( )φ ⋅  are standard normal cumulative distribution and density functions, respectively. 
The two-step estimation procedure can be implemented as follows. First, the probit 
selection model is used to obtain the estimates of γˆ . Second, the estimated value of iλ  is 
included in the wage regression which is then estimated by OLS: 
0 1i i i u iW x T ε ieβ β α σ λ′= + + + +       (5) 
The coefficient on the selection term is an estimate of the covariance between iε  and . The 
standard errors in this equation must be corrected for heteroskedasticity and the use of the 
predicted selectivity variable. Alternatively, one can estimate the model directly using standard 
MLE procedures. Both two-step and ML methods produce estimates of the wage premium which 
takes into account endogeneity of the location choice. 
iu
It must be noted that the foregoing model imposes some rather strong restrictions on the 
nature of the data generating process. In particular, it implies that the error terms in the wage 
equation are perfectly correlated across the urban and rural sectors.  One can relax this restriction 
by estimating a simple two-sector selection model first proposed by Roy (1951). In particular, let 
subscripts 1 and 2 denote non-urban and urban sectors, respectively. Then, assuming that the 
wage equations have sector-specific error terms, we can specify the model as follows. The 
sectoral wage equations are given by 
1 1 1i iW x 1iβ ε′= +         (6) 
2 2 2i iW x 2iβ ε′= +         (7) 
As before, the location decision is determined by the selection equation of the form 
(i i iT I z u 0)γ′= + >         (8) 
If the sector-specific errors are not correlated with  the model can be estimated by OLS. 
However, as discussed above, this assumption is unlikely to hold in the case of location decisions. 
In order to complete the model we impose the standard assumption of joint normality of the error 
terms (Heckman and Honore (1990)). In particular, we assume that  
iu
1 2( , , | ) ~ (0, )i i iu x Nε ε Σ , 
where 
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12 2 2
1 2 1
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σ σ σ
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⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟Σ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
Note that in this model the covariance term 12σ  is not identified because wages of individual  in 
the two sectors cannot be observed simultaneously. This model can be estimated either by 
applying the two-step procedure or directly, by maximizing the following likelihood function 
i
1 1 1 1 2 1 2
1
ln ( [ln( ( )) ln( ( / ) / )] (1 )[ln(1 ( )) ln( ( / ) / )])
n
i i i i i i
i
L T F f T F fθ ε σ σ θ ε σ
=
= + + − − +∑ 2σ  
where  and  are cumulative and density functions of the standard normal distribution, and F f
 
2
( /
1
i j ij
ji
j
z )jγ ρ ε σθ ρ
′ += −  
where jρ  is the correlation coefficient between jiε  and , for iu 1, 2j = . The expectations of the 
wage of worker  in the two sectors conditional on sector choice are given by i
 1 1 1 1 1( | 1, ) ( ) / (i i i i i iE W T x x f z F z )β λ γ γ′ ′= = + ′
)
     (9) 
 1 1 1 1 1( | 0, ) ( ) /(1 ( )i i i i i iE W T x x f z F zβ λ γ γ′ ′= = + − ′
)
    (10) 
 2 2 2 2 2( | 1, ) ( ) / (i i i i i iE W T x x f z F zβ λ γ′ ′= = + γ′
)
     (11) 
2 2 2 2 2( | 0, ) ( ) /(1 ( )i i i i i iE W T x x f z F zβ λ γ γ′ ′= = + − ′     (12) 
where j j jλ σ ρ=  for . Using these equations we can derive the counterfactual predictions 
of the model. In particular, we are interested in the expected wage gain (or loss) from switching 
sectors, which are given by 
1, 2j =
1 1 1( | 1, ) ( | 0,i i i i i iE W T x E W T x1 )= − =  for non-urban workers, and 
 for urban workers. These quantities correspond to the 
sector specific wage premiums which are corrected for possible endogeneity of the sector choice. 
2 2 2( | 1, ) ( | 0,i i i i i iE W T x E W T x= − = 2 )
 
4.4 Data Description 
The data come from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households 
(NFSH). The NSFH consists of a nationally representative sample of individuals, aged 19 or older 
living in households and able to speak English or Spanish. In this study we use the data from first 
wave of NFSH, which were collected in 1987-1988. The sample we use consists of male 
respondents between 19 and 65 year old who work full time (defined as working at least 35 hours 
per week). After restricting the sample to those for whom wage information is available we are 
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left with 3088 observations (implicitly we assume that wage information is missing completely at 
random for those individuals for whom wage data are not available). An individual's place of 
residence is defined as urban if he lives in a Metropolitan Statistical Area, and non-urban 
otherwise. Available data allow us to construct a measure of actual work experience for each 
individual. In addition we utilize other personal characteristics such as marital status, race and 
industry of employment. 
To control for the occupational differences we use the occupation's intelligence 
requirement (OIR) measure developed by Ingram and Neumann (2006). This measure was 
constructed using the data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and Current 
Population Survey (CPS). DOT provides data on various occupational characteristics, that allows 
to use factor analysis in order to develop several broad measures which characterize occupations 
according to intellectual requirements, physical strength, etc. We use the Occupation's 
Intelligence Requirement developed in this study as a proxy for occupational skill complexity. 
This allows us to control for differences in occupational characteristics and measure the returns to 
skills in urban and non-urban labor markets. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
First we estimate the one-sector model by categorizing the observation according to 
whether respondent lives in a MSA ("Urban" = 1) or not ("Urban" = 0). Both OLS and ML 
estimates are presented in Table 2, and the estimates of the selection equation are given in the 
Appendix (Table 9). Even though the model is identified without exclusion restrictions, it is 
generally advisable to have at least one. We include the number of children living in respondent's 
household as an explanatory variable in the selection equation. The dependent variable in both 
equations is the natural logarithm of the nominal hourly wage. In addition to the variables 
presented in the table, each regression contains a set of industry controls. 
The OLS regression produces the urban wage premium of about 16%, which implies that 
observationally equivalent workers living in MSAs earn on average 16% more than their 
counterparts in non-metro areas. Next we estimate the wage premium controlling for possible 
endogenous selection (equation (5)). In this case, the coefficient on the urban dummy is negative 
(-0.149) but it is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Also, the maximum likelihood 
estimates imply that the errors in the wage and selection equations have a positive covariance, 
with implied correlation coefficient 0.43ρ = . The likelihood ratio test rejects the null of 
independent equations (p-value = 0.01). These results suggest that OLS will not produce 
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consistent estimates of the urban wage premium because of the endogeneity of migration 
decisions. 
These results are further extended by estimating the two-sector model which allows for 
sector specific unobserved influences in the wage equations. The results of the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the wage and selection equations are given in Tables 3 and 4. The 
dependent variable is the log of hourly wage. In general these findings suggest that returns to 
observable worker characteristics differ significantly between urban and non-urban areas. The 
marginal effect of one additional year of education is 6% for workers living in MSA's and 4.7% 
for their non-urban counterparts. The return to occupational complexity, as measured by the OIR 
variable, is much larger in the urban sector (12% vs. 7.8% in non-metro areas). On the other hand, 
the marriage premium is much larger in non-urban areas (10% vs. 5.4% in cities). Returns to 
experience seem to be equal in both sectors. This last finding is at odds with wage premium 
theories which emphasize that urban workers experience a higher wage growth. 
The variance of the error terms in the wage equations are of similar magnitude. Most 
importantly, we find evidence of positive correlation between unobserved ability and location 
choice. In particular, the correlation between errors in the wage equations in the urban sector and 
the selection equation ( 1ρ ) is equal to 0.36 and it is statistically significant. This implies that 
workers with high unobserved ability in the urban sector tend to choose that sector as a place of 
work. A similar conclusion about the non-urban sector is suggested by the sign of the 2ρ  term, 
although this coefficient is not statistically significant. Finally the likelihood ratio test rejects the 
null hypothesis of independent equations at the 5% significance level. Consequently, it seems that 
both OLS and fixed-effects methods, that ignore the problem of self-selection, employed in the 
studies of the urban wage premium, produce biased and inconsistent estimates. Turning to the 
selection equation, we see that years of education and occupation complexity tend to increase the 
probability of living in metropolitan area. Years of experience, marriage and number of children 
have the opposite effect. All of these findings are consistent with prior expectations. 
Next we study some counterfactual predictions of the model. In particular, we are 
interested in estimating the wage gain or loss that a person would receive by switching between 
the two sectors. These quantities can be computed using equations (9) to (12), i.e., these are the 
selectivity corrected estimates which take into account the expected values of the sector-specific 
shocks estimated from the model. Table 5 presents the sample averages and standard deviations 
of the predicted wages. 
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In equilibrium we should expect that, on average, none of the workers could gain by 
switching from one sector to the other. The model confirms this intuition and predicts that both 
urban and non-urban workers would experience a wage loss upon changing their sector. In 
particular, the average urban worker would lose about 35% of his wage by moving to the non-
urban location. The corresponding loss for the workers currently residing outside of metropolitan 
areas is equal to 12%. This finding is consistent with the existence of systematic differences in 
unobserved abilities between the two sectors. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper provides selectivity-corrected estimates of the urban wage premium that use a 
nationally representative sample of the working age population. A first look at the data indicates 
that workers residing in Metropolitan Statistical Areas earn on average 17% more than their 
counterparts in non-urban areas, after controlling for occupational and individual characteristics. 
This estimate is similar in magnitude to the ones obtained in previous studies of the urban wage 
premium. However, after taking into account the potential bias introduced by the workers' 
endogenous migration decisions, we show that this estimate of the premium can be interpreted as 
resulting from the selection of more able workers into urban areas. 
A richer set of conclusions is obtained by estimating the two-sector Roy model which 
allows for a general pattern of correlation between the sector-specific shocks (switching 
regression). In this setting we find that returns to education and skills, as measured by the 
occupation's intelligence requirement, are higher in the urban areas, and that sector specific 
shocks are correlated with the error term in the selection equation. In addition, both urban and 
non-urban workers would on average experience a wage loss by switching the location of 
occupation, with the average wage loss higher for urban workers moving out of the urban areas. 
We interpret this as evidence in favor of positive selection, under which workers choose to work 
in the sector where they are more productive. 
The main empirical result of this study is that estimates of the urban wage premium are 
highly sensitive to the assumption of an exogenous location choice. At the same time, the results 
obtained in this study suggest that the hypothesis that the urban wage premium might result from 
the selection of workers with above-average ability (both observed and unobserved) into the 
urban areas must be subjected to careful empirical examination. In particular, estimation methods 
controlling for endogenous selection which go beyond the joint normality assumption imposed by 
the Roy model might be potentially useful in improving our understanding of urban labor 
markets. 
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4.8 Tables 
Table 1. Real Wage, MSA Population and Climatic Conditions  
 (1) (2) 
Variable Coef. St. Error Coef. St. Error 
Log Population 609.5 126.4 658.8 127.7 
Cooling Degree Days   0.631 0.373 
Heating Degree Days   0.381 0.162 
Constant 13003.68 
 
1663.7 9767.18 2181.3 
2R  0.12 0.16 
Observations 175 175 
 
Table 2. Urban Wage Premium 
 OLS (1) ML 
Variable Coef. St. Error Coef. St. Error 
Urban 0.159 0.020 -0.149 0.077 
Education 0.057 0.004 0.063 0.004 
Experience 0.036 0.002 0.034 0.003 
Experience2/100 -0.055 0.006 -0.052 0.006 
OIR 0.110 0.009 0.118 0.009 
Married 0.066 0.017 0.047 0.019 
Black -0.091 0.023 -0.059 0.025 
Hispanic -0.105 0.032 -0.02 0.04 
Constant 1.050 0.078 1.25 0.09 ρ    0.40 0.089 
2R  0.41  
Observations 3088 3088 
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Table 3. ML Estimates of the Wage Equation 
 MSA non-MSA 
Variable Coef. St. Error Coef. St. Error 
Education 0.062 0.004 0.047 0.012 
Experience 0.034 0.003 0.038 0.006 
Experience2/100 -0.053 0.007 -0.057 0.013 
OIR 0.120  0.010  0.078  0.023 
Married 0.054  0.020  0.099  0.049 
Black -0.052  0.027  -0.220 0.075 
Hispanic -0.035  0.039  -0.045  0.249 
Constant 1.06  0.082  1.32  0.24 
jσ  0.45  0.01  0.41  0.03 
jρ  0.36  0.11 -0.25  0.40 
Log-likelihood -3206.47 
Observations 3088 
 
Table 4. Selection Equation 
Variable Coef. St. Error 
Education 0.072 0.013 
Number of Children -0.107 0.0265 
Experience -0.007  0.009 
Experience2/100 0.019  0.0211 
OIR 0.099  0.030 
Married -0.149  0.066 
Black 0.434  0.082 
Hispanic 1.535  0.168 
Constant 0.288  0.244 
Observations 3088 
 
 
Table 5. Predicted Wages in the Two Sectors 
Variable Observations Mean St. Deviation 
1( | 1E W T = )  2449  2.31  0.36 
2( | 0E W T = )  639  2.10  0.35 
1( | 0E W T = )  2449  1.96  0.37 
2( | 1E W T = )  639  1.98 0.33 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics, Full Sample, n=3088 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log Wage 2.27  0.57  0  4.63 
Urban 0.79  0.41 0 1 
Education 13.23  2.83 0 20 
Experience 15.63  10.91 0 51.1 
Experience sqrd. 363.23  461.45 0 2609.5 
IRO 0.20  1.10 -1.80 2.43 
Married 0.63  0.48 0 1 
Number of Children 0.85  1.16 0 8 
Black 0.15  0.36 0 1 
Hispanic 0.08  0.27 0 1 
Agriculture 0.03  0.17 0 1 
Mining 0.01  0.09 0 1 
Construction 0.10  0.30 0 1 
Manufacturing 0.24  0.43 0 1 
Transportation 0.10  0.30 0 1 
Wholesale Trade 0.07  0.25 0 1 
Retail Trade 0.12  0.33 0 1 
Business Rep. Services 0.07  0.25 0 1 
Personal Services 0.02  0.13 0 1 
Entertainment 0.01  0.11 0 1 
Professional Services 0.12  0.33 0 1 
Public Administration 0.07  0.25 0 1 
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Table 7. Summary Statistics, MSA  Sub-Sample, n=2449 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log Wage 2.31  0.57  0  4.6 
Education 13.4  2.87  0  20 
Experience 15.47  10.9  0  49.75 
Experience sqrd. 358  456  0  2475 
IRO 0.26  1.1 -1.8  2.4 
Married 0.61  0.49 0 1 
Number of Children 0.8 1.13 0 7 
Black 0.16  0.37 0 1 
Hispanic 0.099  0.3 0 1 
Agriculture 0.018  0.13 0 1 
Mining 0.004  0.06 0 1 
Construction 0.09  0.29 0 1 
Manufacturing 0.23  0.42 0 1 
Transportation 0.11  0.31 0 1 
Wholesale Trade 0.07  0.25 0 1 
Retail Trade 0.12  0.33 0 1 
Business Rep. Services 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Personal Services 0.017  0.13 0 1 
Entertainment 0.014  0.119 0 1 
Professional Services 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Public Administration 0.07  0.25 0 1 
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Table 8. Summary Statistics, non-MSA  Sub-Sample, n=639 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log Wage 2.1  0.53  0.14  3.75 
Education 12.5  2.53  3  20 
Experience 16.23 10  0  51.1 
Experience sqrd. 382.36  481.7 0  2609.5 
IRO -0.03  1.06  -1.64  2.18 
Married 0.7  0.45 0 1 
Number of Children 1.07  1.24 0 8 
Black 0.11  0.32 0 1 
Hispanic 0.014  0.12 0 1 
Agriculture 0.075  0.26 0 1 
Mining 0.028 0.17 0 1 
Construction 0.13  0.34 0 1 
Manufacturing 0.28  0.45 0 1 
Transportation 0.08  0.28 0 1 
Wholesale Trade 0.06  0.23 0 1 
Retail Trade 0.12  0.33 0 1 
Business Rep. Services 0.04  0.20 0 1 
Personal Services 0.01  0.12 0 1 
Entertainment 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Professional Services 0.08  0.27 0 1 
Public Administration 0.05  0.22 0 1 
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Table 9. Probit Selection Equation, n=3008 
Variable  Coef. Std. Dev. z p-value 
Constant 0.251  0.239  1.05 0.293 
Number of Children -0.102  0.025  -4.03 0.000 
Education 0.071  0.013  5.40  0.000 
Experience -0.008  0.009  -0.88  0.377 
Experience sqrd. 0.021  0.021  1.01  0.312 
IRO 0.103 0.031 3.36 0.001 
Married -0.151  0.065  -2.32  0.021 
Black 0.444  0.082  5.44  0.000 
Hispanic 1.484  0.163  9.12  0.000 
Agriculture -1.114 0.199  -5.57  0.000 
Mining -1.253  0.288  -4.35  0.000 
Construction -0.345  0.165  -2.09  0.037 
Manufacturing -0.345  0.154  -2.24  0.025 
Transportation -0.060 0.169  -0.36  0.721 
Wholesale Trade -0.112 0.180  -0.62 0.535 
Retail Trade -0.271  0.163  -1.66  0.096 
Business Rep. Services 0.048 0.183  0.26  0.792 
Personal Services -0.209  0.265  -0.79  0.430 
Entertainment 0.157 0.320  0.49  0.624 
Professional Services -0.225  0.167 -1.35 0.177 
Public Administration -0.182  0.179  -1.02  0.310 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 In my dissertation I studied three specific questions in the economics of intellectual 
property rights and regional economics. Although all chapters are self-contained, they are related 
in a broad sense by the underlying theme of evaluating potential ways in which public policy 
could be used to improve market outcomes in presence of externalities in production of new 
goods and ideas. In addition, the first two essays share a common focus of the analysis of welfare 
properties of the research exemption, which is defined as a right to use patented inventions in the 
research process. 
 In the first essay, the importance of understanding the welfare properties of research 
exemption is emphasized by arguing that this is one of the major issues which will bear upon the 
evolution of the global system of intellectual property rights in such areas as plant innovation and 
potentially many others. To further our understanding of the incentives to innovate in the 
intellectual property systems with and without research exemption a fully dynamic model of 
R&D race is constructed and analyzed. First, the full characterization of Markov Perfect 
Equilibria of the stochastic game defining the R&D race is achieved, which serves to demonstrate 
the ability of the model to produce rich set of equilibria, depending on the underlying parameter 
structure. Next the welfare properties of the two intellectual property regimes, with and without 
research exemptions are studied. The main conclusion that arises in this process is that there 
exists a potential scope for the research exemption, but only in the case when the R&D cost 
structure is such that initial innovation is not much more costly than the follow up improvements. 
For other industries which are characterized by the high initial cost and low improvement cost 
(e.g. plant breeding) it is shown that the system which eschews research exemption altogether 
will be socially advantageous because it is more efficient in providing adequate incentives to 
invest in the research and development in this case. 
 The second essay continues the analysis of the research exemption provision by 
concentrating specifically on biological inventions which are subject to loss of value due to the 
adaptation of pathogens, such as in the case of new crop varieties or vaccines. We go beyond the 
traditional analysis of this problem, which relies on the insights from the literature on the optimal 
use of the non-renewable resource, by developing a new framework that emphasizes 
consideration of market power brought about by the intellectual property rights and the resulting 
strategic interactions between several firms. The simple model of R&D race with adaptive 
destruction delivers several interesting conclusions. First, firms themselves might prefer a weaker 
intellectual property regime ex ante, if the cost of innovation is small enough. Second, the 
implications of research exemption for the social welfare in the presence of adaptive destruction 
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are qualitatively similar to the fully dynamic model analyzed in the first essay: both weaker and 
stronger intellectual property regimes can be socially optimal depending on the magnitude of the 
R&D cost. 
 The third essay of my dissertation is devoted to the problem of understanding the so called 
urban wage premium, i.e. the fact that observed characteristics of the workers living in urban and 
non-urban areas do not explain the differences in the level of wages they receive. In particular, it 
is well documented that urban residence results in the wage advantage of 25-33%, which cannot 
be reduced below 20% by accounting for differences in education, experience and other worker 
attributes. Clearly, if such differences result from faster learning and knowledge spillovers in 
densely populated areas, there is a scope for public policy aimed at promoting innovation by 
subsidizing various forms of industrial agglomeration in the innovative industries such as high-
tech and biotechnology. If however, these differences do not stem from the external effects but 
are fully internalized by the agents, the scope for policy is much more limited. This essay 
addresses the urban wage premium puzzle by emphasizing that careful accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity of the labor force across various locations is essential in order to understand this 
phenomenon. In contrast to previous studies, I estimate two econometric models that are designed 
to control for possible selection on unobserved characteristics (such as unobserved ability) across 
different geographical areas. I find that after controlling for the endogeneity of the location, we 
find little evidence of the wage advantage of the workers in urban areas, suggesting that explicit 
accounting for the self-selection is essential when studying the urban wage premium.  
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